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ABSTRACT
Deng, Zhui Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2015. Binary Instrumentation and
Transformation for Software Security Applications. Major Professors: Dongyan Xu
and Xiangyu Zhang.
The capabilities of software analysis and manipulation are crucial to counter software security threats such as malware and vulnerabilities. Binary instrumentation
and transformation are the essential techniques to enable software analysis and manipulation. However, existing approaches fail to meet requirements (e.g. flexibility,
transparency) specific in software security applications.
In this dissertation, we design and implement binary instrumentation and transformation systems specifically for software security applications. First, we present
Bistro, a static binary transformation framework that can extract/embed binary
components from/into existing binaries without source code, symbolic or relocation
information. We propose two algorithms to patch both direct and indirect controlflow transfer instructions when performing static binary transformation. Second, we
present Spider, a dynamic binary instrumentation framework that enables efficient
instruction-level instrumentation that is transparent to the instrumented binary program. In Spider, we propose a novel instrumentation primitive based on hardware
virtualization called invisible breakpoint to replace traditional software breakpoint
for better transparency, and design an algorithm to monitor the virtual-to-physical
address mapping in hardware memory virtualization. Finally, we present iRiS, an
iOS application vetting system for detecting private API uses. We propose a novel
analysis of iOS applications using a combination of static analysis and dynamic binary instrumentation, and build iRiS on top of a dynamic binary instrumentation
framework ported to iOS by us.

ix
We build the prototypes of the three aforementioned systems and evaluate their
performance against real-world binary programs. Bistro is able to transform largescale binary programs such as Adobe Reader, and incurs trivial runtime overhead
(1.9% on average) and small space overhead (11% on average). Spider remains
transparent against all state-of-the-art anti-instrumentation detections, and incurs
reasonable overhead which is similar to hardware breakpoint. We also apply Bistro
and Spider in five scenarios to demonstrate their e↵ectiveness in software security
applications. iRiS successfully identified 149 (7%) malicious applications from 2019
applications that have passed the official application vetting process of iOS. From
these malicious applications, iRiS has found the usage of a total number of 153
di↵erent private APIs including 28 security-critical APIs that access sensitive user
information such as device serial number.

1

1 INTRODUCTION
Software industry has advanced significantly over the last decade. Large companies
are building more and more complicated software to accommodate the ever-growing
needs of software users. At the same time, Internet allows a large number of individual
and small groups of software developers to create and distribute their software. This
trend is further amplified by the booming sale of mobile devices such as smartphones
and tablets in recent years; by the end of 2014, there are more than one million
applications available in each of the two major mobile platforms, iOS and Android.
With the fast growth of both the complexity and the total number of software
products, the security of software users becomes an increasing concern. The wide variety of software distribution channels enable malicious attackers to easily distribute
malicious software or trojan-ed legitimate software with malicious logic embedded.
Even legitimate software might contain vulnerabilities which could be exploited remotely by malicious attackers to control and steal information from the victim software user. Vulnerabilities are very common in software from individual or small
teams of developers due to programming error and lack of proper tests. Even for
software produced by large companies or organizations, vulnerabilities still exist and
often cause significant impacts due to the large number of users. For example, the
notorious Heartbleed vulnerability in the widely-used OpenSSL cryptographic library
has a↵ected around half a million websites certified by trusted authorities, allowing
attackers to steal servers’ private keys and user passwords.
To defend against the aforementioned attacks, it is necessary to be able to analyze
and manipulate software. For example, software analysis allows users to detect malicious software or identify which component in a trojan-ed software contains malicious
logic. Software manipulation allows users to remove the malicious logic in a trojan-
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ed software to restore it to its legitimate state, or patch vulnerabilities in legitimate
software to prevent potential attacks.
Software analysis and manipulation are challenging in practice. Although opensource software is becoming prevalent nowadays, many software products are still
distributed in the form of binary executables. Software developers compiles source
code written in a high-level programming language (e.g. C/C++) to target executable in binary form (e.g. x86/ARM instructions) to allow the program being
directly executed on the CPU, which provides much faster execution than an interpreter or simulator. However, the high-level program structural information (e.g.
functions, loops, classes, etc.) is stripped or lost during this process. Although it
is possible to let the compiler keep that information in symbol files for the purpose
of debugging, software developers, especially commercial o↵-the-shelf (COTS) software vendors usually choose not to disclose the symbol files in order to better protect
their intellectual properties from being reverse-engineered. Therefore, the capabilities of binary program analysis and manipulation without source code and symbolic
information is crucial in analyzing and manipulating practical software.
There are two types of binary program analysis and manipulation approaches:
static and dynamic. Static binary transformation operates on the binary program
itself and produces another stand-alone binary program that can execute on its own.
On the other hand, dynamic binary instrumentation operates on the execution of
the binary program. It usually involves an additional runtime environment to inject
additional code to the instruction sequence executed at runtime. Although there are
many existing binary transformation and instrumentation frameworks in both categories, they are either not designed specifically for security or have serious limitations
that prevent their e↵ective usage in software security applications.
None of the existing static binary transformation frameworks [1–10] supports binary component extraction and embedding, which is an important pair of primitives
in a wide range of software security application scenarios. For example, in semantic
patching, software from di↵erent vendors might contain the same third-party library
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code. Suppose one vendor identifies a vulnerable function in this library and releases
a patch for its software, whereas other vendors have not. With binary component
extraction and embedding, we could extract the patched function in the patched
software as a component and embed it into other vendors’ software to replace the
vulnerable version of the same function. Also, in malware analysis, sometimes the
captured malware samples might be non-executable corpses due to various reasons
(e.g. unsuccessful unpacking). In such case, binary component extraction allows us
to extract executable portion from the corpse to analyze its behavior.
For dynamic binary instrumentation, the transparency of the instrumentation
framework is highly desired in software security scenarios. For example, in malware analysis, many samples nowadays are equipped with anti-debugging and antiinstrumentation techniques to counter dynamic analysis. Such samples will cease
their malicious behavior once they detect the dynamic binary instrumentation. Even
in application scenarios which monitor the execution of legitimate programs, such as
high accuracy attack provenance [11], transparent dynamic binary instrumentation
is still necessary as many COTS software products are protected by advanced software protectors which checks for the existence of instrumentation to prevent reverseengineering. Unfortunately, none of the existing dynamic binary instrumentation
framework [12–29] is transparent to the instrumented binary program.
Binary transformation and instrumentation on mobile platforms have received
increasing attention due to the tremendous popularity gained by Android and iOS, the
two dominating mobile platforms. Although there are a lot of existing work [30–37]
based on binary analysis and manipulation tools for Android, few work has been
done on the iOS platform due to its closed-source nature. Compared with Android,
there is no instruction-level dynamic binary instrumentation framework on iOS at
all, so all existing work [38] are based on pure static analysis. Although only a few
iOS malware samples have been reported in the past several years, recent advanced
attacks [39,40] have shown that it is trivial to bypass Apple’s App Review process and
other approaches based on pure static analysis. Therefore, an important challenge is
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to build a strong application vetting system based on dynamic binary instrumentation
to guarantee the security of the iOS application users.

1.1 Thesis Statement
This dissertation address three important challenges in binary instrumentation
and transformation for software security applications. More specifically, we focus on
(1) enabling binary component extraction and embedding in static binary transformation; (2) providing complete transparency in dynamic binary instrumentation and
(3) enabling and applying dynamic binary instrumentation on iOS mobile platform.
This dissertation demonstrates the following statements:
• It is possible to perform static transformation which supports binary component
extraction and embedding on binary program without source code, symbolic or
relocation information.
• It is possible to build a dynamic instrumentation framework which is completely
transparent to the instrumented binary program based on the features in commodity CPUs.
• It is possible to build a dynamic binary instrumentation framework on iOS
mobile platform, and an iOS application vetting system based on dynamic binary instrumentation can substantially increase the e↵ectiveness of application
vetting compared with approaches purely based on static analysis.

1.2 Contributions
Our contributions could be summarized as follows.
• As illustrated in Figure 1.1, we propose a static binary transformation framework called Bistro1 to extract/embed binary component from/into existing

1

Bistro stands for BInary STRetching Operation.
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x86 Binary
Executable

BISTRO

Binary
Components

Static Binary
Transformation
Transformed
Executable

iOS
Binary

SPIDER

Instrumented
Execution

iRiS

Private API
Uses

Dynamic Binary Instrumentation

Figure 1.1.: Binary transformation and instrumentation frameworks for software
security applications.

binary programs without source code, symbolic or relocation information. We
propose two algorithms to patch both direct and indirect control-flow instructions in the target binary program to preserve its functional correctness.
• We propose a dynamic binary instrumentation framework called Spider2 that
is transparent to the instrumented program. In order to achieve transparency,
we propose a novel instrumentation primitive called invisible breakpoint based
on hardware virtualization to replace software breakpoint in traditional instrumentation.
• We have implemented a prototype of Bistro for x86 Win32 PE binaries, and
a prototype of Spider for both Windows and Linux guests on x86. We evaluated their e↵ectiveness and efficiency in many software security applications.
In particular, we use Bistro to patch vulnerabilities, extract executable components from malware corpse and stitch malware samples for penetration tests.
2

Spider is the acronym of Stealthy binary Program Instrumentation and Debugging EnviRonment.
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We use Spider to improve instrumentation in attack provenance and capture
confidential information in digital forensics.
• We have ported Valgrind [18] to enable dynamic binary instrumentation on iOS
mobile platform. Based on the dynamic binary instrumentation framework, we
have designed and implemented an automated iOS application vetting system
called iRiS which uses a combination of static and dynamic analysis. We have
applied iRiS to detect user privacy leakage due to the use of security-critical
private APIs in iOS applications.

1.3 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation consists of four chapters. Following this introductory chapter,
Chapter 2 presents the design and implementation of Bistro, our static binary transformation framework. Chapter 3 presents the design and implementation of Spider,
our dynamic binary instrumentation framework. In Chapter 2 and 3 we also evaluate
the performance of our framework and demonstrate its application in several software
security and malware analysis scenarios. Chapter 4 presents the design and implementation of iRiS, our binary instrumentation and analysis system on iOS mobile
platform. In Chapter 5 we conclude and present our future work.
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2 BISTRO: BINARY COMPONENT EXTRACTION AND EMBEDDING
2.1 Introduction
In software security and malware analysis, researchers often need to manipulate
binary code – benign or malicious – without source code or symbolic information. One
pair of complementary binary manipulation primitives is to (1) extract a re-usable
functional component from a binary program and (2) embed a value-added functional
component in an existing binary program. We call the binary manipulation primitives
described above binary component extraction and embedding. These primitives are
useful in a wide range of software security and malware analysis scenarios. In security
hardening of legacy binaries, binary component embedding enables the retrofitting of
legacy or close-source software with a third-party functional component that performs
a value-added security function such as access control policy enforcement. In binary
semantic patching, binary programs from di↵erent vendors may leverage the same
functional component. Suppose one vendor identifies a vulnerability in such a component and releases a patched version for its own program; whereas other vendors
are not aware of the vulnerability or have not patched their products. We can apply
binary component extraction to carve out the patched component from a patched
program and replace the vulnerable version of the same component in an un-patched
program using binary component embedding. In malware analysis, binary component
extraction and embedding supports “plug and play” of malicious functions extracted
from malware captured in the wild. One can even “stitch” multiple extracted malware functions to compose a new piece of malware – a capability that may help enable
strategic defence in cyber warfare.
Enabling binary component extraction and embedding poses significant challenges.
Brute force extraction and insertion of binary functions will most likely fail. Instead,
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both the extracted component and the target binary program need to be carefully
transformed. For example, instructions in the target binary need to be shifted to
create space for the embedded function; when a function is extracted from its origin binary, the instructions in it need to be re-positioned and re-packaged; accesses
to global variables need to be re-positioned; function pointers need to be properly
handled; and indirect jumps/calls need to have their target addresses recalculated.
These problems are especially challenging when the binary component or the target
binary program is not relocatable, which is often the case when dealing with legacy
or malware binaries.
Despite advances in binary instrumentation and rewriting, existing techniques
are inadequate to address the binary component extraction and embedding challenges. Dynamic binary instrumentation tools such as PIN [17], Valgrind [18], DynamoRIO [19] and QEMU [41] perform instrumentation only when a binary program
is executed on their infrastructures. They do not generate an instrumented, standalone version of the binary for production runs. Static binary rewriting tools such
as Diablo [1], Alto [2], Vulcan [3], and Atom [4] can generate instrumented, standalone binaries. However, they require symbolic information or that the binaries be
generated by special compilers.
More lightweight techniques exist that do not require symbolic information or
special compilers [5–10]. Among these techniques, some create trampolines at the
end of the target binary program in which instrumentation is placed and then use
control flow detours to access the trampolines [5–7]. The others duplicate the body
of the target binary program in its virtual memory space and only the replica is
instrumented. The original binary body is retained in its original position to provide
a kind of control flow forwarding mechanism [8–10]. However, none of these techniques
supports extraction of binary component or implanting an extracted component to
another binary. Many of them cause substantial space/performance overhead. To
the best of our knowledge, none of them has been successfully applied to large-scale
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Windows applications or kernel code. A more detailed comparison is presented in
Section 2.3.
Recently, researchers proposed approaches that focus on identification, extraction
and reuse of components from binaries. Inspector Gadget [42] performs dynamic
slicing to identify and extract components from malware. The extracted component
might have incomplete code path coverage due to the limitation of dynamic analysis.
BCR [43] adopts a combination of static and dynamic approach to extract a function
from a binary. However, it uses labels to represent jump/call targets, thus does
not preserve the semantic of indirect jumps/calls. ROC [44] uses dynamic slicing
to identify reusable functional components in a binary but does not extract them.
None of them supports reusing extracted components to enhance legacy binaries.
Moreover, they could not extract components from non-executable binaries (e.g.,
malware corpse) due to the use of dynamic analysis.
In this chapter, we present Bistro, a systematic approach to binary functional
component extraction and embedding. Bistro automatically performs the following: (1) extracting a functional component, with its instructions and data section
entries non-contiguously located in the virtual address space, from an original binary
program and (2) embedding a binary component of any size at any user-specified
location in a target binary program, without requiring symbolic information, relocation information, or compiler support. For both extraction and embedding, Bistro
preserves the functionalities of the target binary program and the extracted component by accurately patching them – using the same approach and technique. Bistro
performs extraction and embedding operations efficiently and the “stretched” target
binary program after embedding only incurs small time and space overhead.
We have developed a prototype of Bistro as a IDA-Pro [13] plugin. We have
conducted extensive evaluation and case studies using real-world Windows-based applications (including large-scale software such as Firefox and Adobe Reader), kernellevel device drivers, and malware. Our evaluation (Section 2.7) indicates Bistro’s
efficiency and precision in patching the extracted components and target binary pro-
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Original binary program Q
Component to extract

To be called
independently

Binary
Extractor Component c

Independent
Component

Target
binary P

Binary
Stretcher

Stretched binary
program
P’ = P + c

Figure 2.1.: Overview of Bistro.

grams. Moreover, the stretched target binary program incurs small performance
overhead (1.9% on average) and space overhead (10.9% on average). We have applied Bistro to the following usage cases: (1) We carve out patched components
from a binary and use them to replace their un-patched versions in other application
binaries, achieving binary semantic patching (Section 2.7.2); (2) We stitch malicious
functions from an un-executable Conficker worm [45] sample and compose a new,
executable malware (Section 2.7.3); and (3) We demonstrate the realistic threat of
trojan-ed device drivers with malicious rootkit functions embedded in benign driver
– using real-world drivers and rootkits (Section 2.7.4).

2.2 Overview and Assumptions
An overview of Bistro is shown in Figure 4.3. Bistro has two key components:
binary extractor and binary stretcher.
• The binary extractor is responsible for extracting a designated functional component c from an original binary program Q. c includes both the code and data
of the functional component. The extractor does so by removing the unwanted
code and data from Q and then collapsing the remaining data and code into a
re-usable component c that occupies a contiguous virtual address region. More
importantly, the instructions in c are properly patched for repositioning. We
note that c can either be called as a library function or be embedded directly
in another binary program.
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• The binary stretcher is responsible for stretching the target binary program P
to make “room” (holes in its address space) to embed a function component.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the stretcher takes the target binary P and the to-beembedded component c as input; stretches P , and patches the code in P to
allow the embedding of c. The output of the stretcher is a “stretched” binary
program P 0 = P + c that is ready for execution.
Summary of Enabling Techniques. Both the binary extractor and stretcher are
based on the same binary stretching algorithm (Section 2.4). The overarching idea is
to shift instructions for creating space (by stretcher) or squeezing out unwanted space
(by extractor). The algorithm focuses on patching the control transfer and global data
reference instructions by precisely computing the o↵sets they need to be adjusted.
For instance, if a component with size |c| = n is inserted, all the original instructions
following the insertion point will be shifted by n bytes, and control transfers to any
of the shifted instructions need to be incremented by n.
To address the challenge of handling indirect calls and call back functions invoked
by external libraries, we develop another algorithm (Section 2.5.1) that stretches a
subject binary at the original entries of functions that are potential targets of indirect
calls, creating small holes (usually a few bytes) to hold a long jump instruction to
forward any calls to those functions to their shifted locations. These holes must not
be shifted by any stretching/shrinking operations. They always stay in their original
positions and we thus call them “anchors”. Our algorithm precisely takes into account
these anchors when performing stretching/shrinking. To handle indirect jumps, we
leverage an efficient perfect hashing scheme to translate jump targets dynamically.
We use these approaches to patch indirect jumps/calls in both the component and
the target binary.
Assumptions. We make the following assumptions (and hence stating the non-goals
of Bistro): (1) The user, not Bistro, will predetermine the semantic appropriateness of embedding functional component c in target program P . Furthermore, he/she
will decide the specific location to insert the component. This can be practically done
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by performing reverse engineering on P . For example, to harden P with some security
policy enforcement mechanism based on control flow [46], the user can reconstruct
the control flow graph of P , collect its dominance and post-dominance information,
and decide proper locations to insert c. (2) The identification of component c in the
original program Q, including its code and data, is done a priori by the user through
manual or automated techniques, such as Inspector Gadget [42], binary slicing [47],
binary di↵erencing [48], and BCR [43]. While we will present our experience with
functional component identification in our case studies (Section 2.7), the identification technique itself is outside the scope of this work. (3) Binaries can be properly
disassembled (e.g., by IDA-Pro) before being passed to Bistro. This assumption
is supported by the large number of real-world, o↵-the-shelf binaries in our experiments. Although we currently do not handle obfuscated or self-modifying binaries,
we note that, in addition to IDA-Pro, other conservative disassembling [10, 49] and
unpacking [50] tools can also be used as the pre-processor of Bistro to handle more
sophisticated binaries.

2.3 Problems with Existing Techniques
Before presenting Bistro, we take an in-depth look at the existing binary rewriting techniques and explain their limitations for binary component extraction and
implanting. Our discussion only focuses on existing techniques that work on stripped
binaries without debugging symbols or relocation information, which we classify into
two categories: detour-based rewriting and duplication-based rewriting.
Detour-Based Rewriting. Detour-based binary rewriters [5–7] create control flow
detours from the original code to the instrumentation. More specifically, to instrument
an instruction, the rewriter replaces the instruction with a detour to a trampoline,
where the instrumentation code is located. At the end of the instrumentation, the
control flow jumps back to the original code. For example, as shown in Figure 2.2,
suppose we need to count the number of times function Func B gets called. The
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instrumentation involves replacing the three instructions at the entry of Func B with
a jump instruction, which detours the control flow to the trampoline code Tramp B
placed at the end of the binary. Tramp B will increment the counter, execute the
three instructions that were replaced, and jump back to the instruction right after
the instrumentation point. Detour-based rewriting works well when the number of
instrumentation points is small and the instrumentation code is simple.
Func_A:
call Func_B
...

Func_B:
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 60h
push ebx
...

Func_C:
jmp Table [eax *4]
loc_1:
xor eax, eax
loc_2:
xor ebx, ebx
loc_3:
push eax
push ebx
...
Table:
dd offset loc _1
dd offset loc _2
dd offset loc _3

(a) before detour

Func_A:
call Func_B
...

Func_C:
jmp Table [eax *4]

Func_B:
jmp Tramp _B
nop
push ebx
...

loc_1:
//loc_2, loc_3
pointing to the jmp
jmp Tramp_C
push ebx
...

Tramp_B:
inc [counter]
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 60h
jmp Func_B + 6

Tramp_C:
inc [counter]
xor eax, eax
xor ebx, ebx
push eax
jmp loc_1 + 5

(b) after detour

Figure 2.2.: Examples of detour using trampoline. Arrows show the direction of
control-flow. The dashed line shows ill-formed control-flow.

The main problem with detour-based rewriting is that it requires the instructions
to be replaced at the instrumentation point be relocatable. To understand this problem, let us look at the case where we try to perform the same instrumentation at loc 1
in function Func C. There is an indirect jump in Func C using a jump table Table,
with potential targets loc 1, loc 2, and loc 3 – such structure is often generated by
the compiler to represent a switch statement. We replace the instructions at loc 1
with the unconditional jump instruction, which will take 5 bytes, and the instructions
being replaced will be relocated to the trampoline code in Tramp C. However, now
loc 2 and loc 3 will point to the middle of the jump instruction, causing ill-formed
control flow. While it seems that one can patch the jump table in this example, the
problem becomes much more difficult to fix if an overwritten instruction is the computed target of some indirect jump/call, as the target may be stored in some data
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structure fields or generated dynamically via complex computation. One might also
consider using software breakpoint (a special one-byte instruction) instead of jump
instruction to detour the control flow. However, software breakpoints incur significant
performance overhead.
Duplication-Based Rewriting. Recently, duplication-based binary rewriters [8–
10] are proposed. These techniques make a copy of the original code sections and
then instrument the copy. The instrumented copy is executed in cooperation with
the original code. In particular, to preserve control flow correctness, branch targets
in the instrumented copy need to be patched. To handle indirect calls and jumps,
jump/call targets in the original code sections are replaced with redirection to their
new targets in the instrumented copy. The original data sections are also reused by
the new copy.
The first problem with duplication-based techniques is their excessive space requirement. For the code sections, the space has to be almost doubled. Second, it
is difficult to precisely determine all the possible targets of each indirect jump/call
before instrumentation [9, 10] (for the sake of inserting redirection). Using a conservative analysis may result in large sets of potential targets, leading to runtime
inefficiency [9].
Low
address

A.text

B.text
jmp eax
…

A.data

B.data

A.text

A.text

B.text

A.data
trampoline

A.data

B.data

copy of A.text

jmp eax
…
High
address

(a) before rewriting

B’s component
(b) detour-based

jmp eax
…

Conflict as both
need to be preserved

(c) duplication-based

Figure 2.3.: Difficulties when transplanting a component (marked as shaded) from
binary B into binary A.

Most importantly, neither duplication-based nor detour-based rewriting supports
binary component transplanting – the main application scenario of Bistro. Consider
the example in Figure 2.3. Suppose we wish to extract a component from B and insert
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it into A. The component is shaded in (a) and contains an indirect jump instruction.
In (b), a detour-based technique is applied and the component is inserted in the
trampoline at the end of A’s body. However, the indirect jump in the component
will not work properly, jumping to some irrelevant location in A instead of to the
correct target as if in B. In (c), a duplication-based techniques is applied. The text
section of A is duplicated and the component is inserted to the replica. However, to
ensure correctness of the indirect jump in A, it is necessary to preserve B’s original
text section at the same location as in B and insert redirection at the original possible
targets of the indirect jump. Unfortunately, the position of B’s text section conflicts
with that of A’s in the virtual address space. Such conflict is highly likely to happen
in practice: by default, common compilers choose to select the same base loading
address when generating executable binaries: 0x400000 for Windows PE binaries and
0x8048000 for Linux ELF binaries. This means that most binaries will overlap from
the very beginning when loaded into memory.

2.4 Basic Algorithm for Binary Extraction/Stretching
In this section, we present the basic algorithm (Algorithm 1) executed by both the
binary extractor and stretcher of Bistro (Section 3.3). For the time being, we assume
(1) there is no indirect control transfer and (2) global data is directly referenced in
an instruction using its address.
The algorithm takes the subject binary and a list of virtual address intervals
called snippets representing (1) the holes to be created in the binary in the case
of stretching or (2) the unwanted instruction/data blocks in the case of shrinking
(extraction). First, for each byte in the binary, the algorithm computes a mapping
between its original index in the binary and its corresponding index after the snippets
are inserted/removed. After that, the algorithm patches address operands in control
transfer and global data reference instructions, and copy each byte to its mapped
location according to the mapping.
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Practical Challenges. To make Bistro work for real-world large-scale software, we
still need to overcome a number of practical challenges not addressed by Algorithm 1.
• The target of an indirect control transfer instruction (e.g., call eax) is computed during execution and takes di↵erent values depending on the execution
path. Such an instruction cannot be patched by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Basic binary stretching/shrinking algorithm
Input:

P – the subject binary; it has size and base addr fields to represent its size when loaded into memory
and base loading address, respectively.

Output:

1:
2:
3:
4:

M – a list of address intervals represent code/data to be inserted/removed, sorted increasingly by
their location; each interval has addr, len and type fields, denoting the location, size and type
respectively. Type “INSERT” means inserting right before addr; “REMOVE” means the block
starting at addr is to be removed.
P 0 – the stretched/shrunk binary.

function BasicStretching(P, M )
map
ComputeMapping(P, M )
P0
PatchTarget(P, map)
end function

5: function ComputeMapping(P, M )
6: o↵set 0
7: m M.begin()
8: for i 0 to P.size do
9: if m.addr == P.base addr + i then
10:
if m.type == IN SERT then
11:
o↵set
o↵set + m.len
12:
else if m.type == REM OV E then
13:
o↵set
o↵set m.len
14:
i
i + m.len
15:
end if
16:
m
M.next()
17: end if
18: map[i] i + o↵set
19: end for
20: return map
21: end function
22: function PatchTarget(P, map)
23: P 0 {nop, nop, ..., nop}
24: for i 0 to P.size do

25: if map[i] 6= ? then
26:
if P [i] is instruction then
27:
ins
P [i]
28:
for each data address operand op in ins do
29:
target
op.addr P.base addr
30:
o↵
map[target] target
31:
op.addr
op.addr + o↵
32:
end for
33:
if ins is near call/jump then
34:
target
i + ins.len + ins.target
35:
o↵
map[target] target
36:
o↵ 0
map[i + ins.len] (i + ins.len)
37:
ins.target
ins.target + o↵
o↵ 0
38:
else if ins is far call/jump then
39:
target
ins.target P.base addr
40:
o↵
map[target] target
41:
ins.target
ins.target + o↵
42:
end if
43:
P 0 [map[i]]
ins
44:
else if P [i] is data then
45:
P 0 [map[i]]
P [i]
46:
end if
47: end if
48: end for
49: return P 0
50: end function

• Function pointers may be present in data or in an instruction as an immediate
operand. These function pointers might be passed as parameters to external
libraries as callback functions. If a function is relocated due to stretching, the
external library will call back to a wrong address. All these have to be properly
handled to ensure correctness of binary stretching/shrinking.
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• Accesses to global data may be via data pointers (e.g., mov ebx, ptr data;
mov eax, [ebx+4]). The addresses of data are not known until runtime. These
instructions cannot be patched using Algorithm 1 either.
We will present our solutions to these challenges in the following sections.

2.5 Handling Indirect Control Transfer
Handling indirect jumps and calls is one of the key challenges in the design of
Bistro. The difficulty is that the jump/call target cannot be known statically and
thus is hard to patch. To understand the challenge, consider the example in Figure 2.4.
On the left, there are three objects that are connected via pointers, with two of type
B and one of type A. On the right, part of function foo() is presented. The function
takes two parameters stored in eax and ebx denoting pointer values. These two
pointers may be aliased to each other. If so, ecx at 0x4302B2 gets the value 0x400340
defined at 0x4302A0, and then eventually the call instruction at 0x4302BD acquires
the function pointer 0x444142. However, if the two pointer parameters are not aliased,
the call instruction may get a completely di↵erent target, making statically patching
it difficult.
.rdata:0x400300 0x444142
.rdata:0x400304 36
…
.rdata:0x400324 0
.rdata:0x400328 0x400300
…
.rdata:0x400340 1
.rdata:0x400344 0x400324
…
.rdata:0x40040A “BAD\0”

//int (*fp)();
//int x;

Class A a;

//int y;
//void * p;

Class B b1

//int y;
//void * p;

Class B b2

//foo (eax, ebx):
.text:0x4302A0
.text:0x4302B2
.text:0x4302B6
.text:0x4302BA
.text:0x4302BD

mov
…
mov
mov
mov
call

[eax], 0x400340 //eax=&b2
ecx, [ebx]
edx, [ecx+4]
eax, [edx+4]
[eax]

//ebx aliased to eax
//edx=400324
//eax=400300
//*(a.fp)( )

//char * s

Figure 2.4.: An example showing indirect call handling in binary
stretching/extraction.

A naive solution is to identify and patch any constant value in the binary that
appears to be a jump/call target. But this is not safe as such values may not be
jump/call targets. Notice in the example, there is a null-terminated string “BAD” at
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address 0x40040A. With the little endian representation in x86, this string has the
same binary value as the function pointer at 0x400300. Without type information,
it is impossible to know whether the value is a string or function pointer. Failure
to identify and patch a function pointer leads to broken control-flow, changing the
semantics of the target binary. Misclassifying a string as a function pointer leads
to undesirable changes to data. While it is plausible to leverage recent advances in
binary type inference to type constants in a binary [51–54], the involvement of aliasing
as in the example makes such analysis very difficult. In fact, IDA-Pro [13] failed to
recognize the function pointer for this case.
If a binary has a relocation table and it does not perform any address space layout self-management such as through a packer, the relocation table will provide the
positions of all constant values that are jump/call targets for Bistro to patch them,
thus lead to a sound and complete solution to binary stretching/shrinking. However,
relocation table may be absent or contain bogus entries in legacy and malware binaries. Hence, in our work, we do not assume the presence of relocation tables in our
design and evaluation. Next, we describe how to handle indirect calls in Section 2.5.1
and indirect jumps in Section 2.5.2.

2.5.1 Handling Indirect Calls
Indirect calls are very common in modern binaries to leverage the flexibility of
function pointers. We have discussed the difficulty of handling function pointers at
the beginning of Section 2.5. In fact, there is a more challenging situation, in which
a binary may pass its function addresses to external library functions which call back
the provided functions (e.g., a user function cmp() is provided as a parameter to an
external library function qsort()). In this case, if a function entry has changed due
to stretching or shrinking, its invocation sites are outside the body of the binary and
thus beyond our control. It is difficult to patch call back function pointer parameters
before they are passed on to libraries for two reasons. First, a function pointer might
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not directly appear as a parameter. It could be a member of a structure passed to
an external library. It may even require several layers of pointer indirection to access
its value. Patching that is challenging. Second, for many external library functions,
we cannot assume the availability of their prototype definitions, it is hence difficult
to know their parameter types.
To handle indirect calls including call back functions, we propose to stretch the
target binary to make small holes at the entry point of each function that may be an
indirect call target. These holes are called anchors; they should not be moved during
stretching/shrinking. Inside an anchor, we place a jump instruction that jumps to its
mapped new address in the stretched/shrunk binary, which is the new entry of the
function. As such, we do not need to identify or patch any function pointers in the
binary.
Since an anchor must be placed at a fixed address in the stretched binary, it could
coincide with instructions that get shifted to the address. To ensure correctness, we
put a jump right before an anchor to jump over it. We call the jump the prefix of an
anchor.

…
//cmp
400120: push
400122: mov
400126: add
…
…

()
ebp
ebp, esp
esp, …

anchor

app.exe

app.exe
…
400120:
400122:
…

40

…
400120:
400125:
…

app.exe
jmp 400125
jmp 400169

401640: push 0x400120
401645: call sort
…

//cmp ()
400160: push ebp
…
401680: push 0x400120
401685: call sort
…

400169:

//qsort() msvcrt.dll
…
//eax= 0x400120
AF8614: call eax
…

//qsort() msvcrt.dll
…
//eax= 0x400120
AF8614: call eax
…

//qsort() msvcrt.dll
…
//eax= 0x400120
AF8614: call eax
…

(a) original binary

(b) stretching w/o anchor

40+
9

//cmp ()
push ebp
…
401689: push 0x400120
40168E: call sort
…

(c) stretching w/ anchor

Figure 2.5.: Stretching with anchors. The shaded area in (b) is the 40-byte snippet
inserted.
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Consider the example in Figure 2.5 (a), in which the call-back function cmp() is
invoked inside qsort(). The entry address of function cmp() in the original binary
is 0x400120. When we stretch without anchors as shown in (b), in function qsort(),
the indirect call to cmp() at 0xAF8614 will incorrectly go to 0x400120 in the shaded
area. When we stretch with anchors as shown in Figure 2.5(c), an anchor containing
the jump instruction will be placed at 0x400120. Any indirect call that goes to the
original entry address of cmp(), 0x400120, will be redirected to the actual function
body at the new entry address. The jump instruction preceding 0x400120 is its prefix.
Anchor-based Algorithm. With the presence of anchors, fixing control flow transfer instructions becomes more challenging than that in Algorithm 1. We hence devise
a new algorithm (Algorithm 2). The idea is to divide the stretching/shrinking operation into two phases. In phase one, the subject binary program is stretched/shrunk
using Algorithm 1 to create space for the inserted snippets or removed blocks. Then
the stretched/shrunk binary is further stretched to insert anchors using a similar
procedure. Separating the two phases substantially simplifies the interference from
anchors.
Algorithm 2 Anchor-based stretching algorithm.
Input:

P – the subject binary; it has size and base addr fields to represent its size when loaded into memory
and base loading address, respectively.
M – a list of code/data snippets to be inserted/removed, sorted increasingly by their location; each
snippet has addr, len and type fields, denoting the location, size and type respectively.
A – a list of anchors to be placed, sorted increasingly by their location; each anchor has addr and
len fields, denoting the location and the content size, respectively.

Output:

anchor map – the mapping between the indices after placing snippets and their corresponding indices
after anchors are placed.
pref ixlen[a] – the prefix length of an anchor a.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

function StrechingWithAnchor(P, M, A)
map
ComputeMapping(P, M )
Pt
PatchTarget(P, map)
anchor map
ComputeAcMapping(Pt , A)
P0
PatchTarget(Pt , anchor map)
end function

7: function ComputeAcMapping(P, A)
8: o↵set 0
9: ac A.begin()
10: i 0
11: while i < P.size do
12: curaddr P.base addr + i + o↵set
13: if ac.addr == curaddr then
14:
pref ix
i SIZEOF(JMP)

15:

if P [pref ix] is not the start of an instruction
then
16:
pref ix
start of instruction before pref ix
17:
end if
18:
pref ixlen[ac]
i pref ix
19:
i
pref ix
20:
o↵set
o↵set + ac.len + pref ixlen[ac]
21:
ac
A.next()
22: else
23:
anchor map[i]
i + o↵set
24:
i
i+1
25: end if
26: end while
27: return anchor map
28: end function
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Pruning Anchors. Potentially, we can create anchors for all function entries to
guarantee that we will never miss any necessary function call forwarding. However,
this is not efficient. In fact, we only need to create anchors for the subset of functions
that could be the possible target of some indirect call. Assuming a 32-bit machine,
we construct the subset with the following criterion: Any four-byte data value or
any four-byte immediate operand in an instruction is considered a possible indirect
call target, if it is equal to one of the function entries. We obtain this subset by
sequentially scanning data and code sections. Our pruning heuristic is very e↵ective
in practice. For example, the code section size of gcc in SPEC CPU 2000 benchmark
suite is over 1MB, with over 2000 functions; after pruning, there are only 271 functions
left that need anchors.
Embedding a Component with Anchors. If an extracted component contains
a function that may be invoked by an indirect call in the component, Bistro will
create an anchor in the target binary at exactly the same address of the function
entry in the component’s original binary to allow proper forwarding. If the anchor
conflicts with some existing anchor in the target binary, Bistro will integrate the
two overlapping anchors into an arbitration function and redirect control flow to the
function instead. The function further determines which real target it should forward
the call to. The calls from the target binary and those from the to-be-embedded
component are distinguished by setting a flag. The arbitration function uses the flag
to decide the real forwarding target.
In some rare cases, the space between two function entries might not be enough
to hold the anchors. In such cases, instead of using the jump instruction for redirection, we use a software interrupt instruction, which takes only one byte. When
an indirect call reaches the old function entry, a software exception will be generated
and intercepted by our exception handler, which will redirect the control flow to the
new function entry.
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2.5.2 Handling Indirect Jumps
Indirect jumps are di↵erent from indirect calls as the jump targets may not be
function entries, but rather anywhere in the binary. If we adopt the anchor approach,
there would be too many anchors needed. One might leverage some heuristics such
as that indirect jumps usually receive their targets from jump tables and thus simply
patch the jump table entries. However, this is unsafe because of the difficulty of
determining jump table boundaries. A jump table may not be distinguishable from
regular data. Hence, we propose a di↵erent approach. Specifically, we insert a code
snippet right before each indirect jump to translate the jump target to its mapped
address in the stretched binary at runtime, as shown in the example below.
mov eax, mapping[eax - old_base]

jmp eax
!

add eax, new_base
jmp eax

Note that the example is just for illustration. In our implementation, we use perfect hashing for address lookup, which will be explained later, and preserve the flag
register during translation. Since a complete byte-to-byte mapping is computed in
Algorithm 1, any indirect jump target could be properly translated and handled by
this method. Observe that additional instructions need to be added to perform translation. We can easily handle this by stretching the subject binary to accommodate
these instructions.
Branch Target Set Pruning. Although the translation using a complete mapping
guarantees safety, it also introduces significant memory overhead. Each byte in the
original binary requires 4 bytes to represent its mapped address. In fact, we only
need a subset of the mapping: the stretched/shrunk binary will be safe as long as the
mapping contains translation for every possible indirect jump target.
We construct the set with the following criterion: any four-byte data value or any
four-byte immediate operand in an instruction is considered a possible indirect jump
target, if the value falls in the range of some code section. We further prune the set
by removing the values that point to the middle of an existing instruction. Note that
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the strategy is safe for long/set jumps as their jump targets are acquired at runtime.
This pruning strategy is very e↵ective in practice. For example, the code section size
of Adobe Reader X (AcroRd32.exe) is over 800KB, with over 260K instructions; after
pruning, there are only 3635 possible branch targets left.
Perfect Hash Translator. The remaining challenge is to achieve fast translation.
Note that after pruning, the jump target set becomes a sparse set in the address space.
As a compromise between memory consumption and runtime overhead, we choose to
use perfect hashing for translation. A perfect hash function maps a set of keys to
another set of integer values without any collision. It guarantees O(1) translation
time. We use gperf [55] to generate the perfect hash function for the jump target
set and compile it into a linkable .obj file that can be embedded in the target binary
through Bistro.
A perfect hash function may require more space than the N keys to achieve O(1)
translation time. In practice, we find the size of generated perfect hash functions
acceptable. For example, for the 3635 branch targets of Adobe Reader, the generated
hash function is about 152KB, which is about 11% of the size of the Adobe Reader
binary.

2.6 Handling Data References
Binary extraction/stretching may cause relocation of data entries, so we need
to ensure the correctness of instructions referencing those data. We discuss how to
address this problem from the perspectives of the target binary and the component
to be embedded.
Compared to the component, the target binary is usually more complex and involves a lot of global data references. To handle this problem efficiently, we group
data in the binary as continuous data blocks. If a data block might be indirectly accessed, we will make sure the block is not re-located to avoid patching data accesses,
by wrapping the block in an anchor. Note that the number of data access instructions
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is much larger than the number of indirect jumps/calls. Otherwise, if the data block
is only directly accessed, we allow it to be relocated (by Algorithm 1). We use the
following criterion: if the value of any four-byte data, or any four-byte immediate
operand (in an instruction) that is not directly used as an address falls in the range
of a data block, then this block might be indirectly accessed using data pointers, and
hence should not be re-located.
In contrast, data entries extracted as part of the to-be-embedded component are
most likely to be relocated. For example, if they are sparsely distributed in the
address space, the Bistro extractor (Section 3.3) will collapse them into a contiguous
block, causing relocation. We adopt a method similar to the dynamic jump target
translation scheme to translate data reference addresses. We add a comparison before
translation to avoid translating stack or heap accesses. According to our experience,
only 2% of dynamic memory references need to be translated. We further use o✏ine
static peephole scanning to identify references that surely access stack and avoid
instrumenting them completely.

2.7 Evaluation
We have implemented Bistro for Win32 PE binaries as an IDA-Pro plug-in.
We have addressed a variety of engineering challenges such as virtual space layout
re-arrangement with a large embedded component, patching PE header, import and
export tables, and re-generating relocation table.

2.7.1 Performance: Efficiency and Overhead
We first evaluate the performance of Bistro by stretching real-world Windowsbased applications and SPEC CPU 2000 binaries. Our experiments are done on a
Dell Inspiron 15R laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2410M 2.30GHz CPU and 4GB
memory, running Windows 7 SP1. For the SPEC CPU 2000 benchmark suite, we
use the “win32-x86-vc7” config file which includes all integer benchmark binaries and
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four floating-point benchmark binaries. We compile the benchmark suite using Visual
Studio 2010, with full optimizations. To test Bistro on non-relocatable binaries, we
set “/DYNAMICBASE:NO” switch for the compiler to prevent it from generating
relocatable binaries. The application binaries are readily available and we do not
know about their compilers. Although the binaries of Adobe Reader and Chrome
web browser carry relocation tables, we ignore them for testing our solutions for
non-relocatable binaries.
We measure the following performance metrics: (1) space overhead – for both
binary file and initial memory image – of a stretched binary compared with its original
version, (2) runtime overhead of the stretched binary, and (3) time for Bistro to
stretch the binary. In particular, we are interested in the overhead incurred by Bistro
itself, not by the execution of the embedded components. As such, we embed a
minimal component (a one-byte snippet) into each subject binary in our experiments.
To create a “worst-case” scenario, we insert it at the beginning of each binary so that
every byte in the binary gets shifted, which entails all indirect control transfer targets
in the binary to be redirected. The measured overhead is hence the upper bound of
overhead.
For each SPEC 2000 binary, we run both its original and stretched versions, and
compare their execution time and file/initial image size. We do not measure the
execution time of the Windows applications because they are all interactive. We
experience no perceivable overhead when using their stretched versions.
The results are shown in Table 2.1. From the Indirect Jumps and Indirect Calls
1

columns, we observe that indirect calls are very common in application binaries,

indicating that they might be C++ programs. Further investigation confirms our
speculation, indicating Bistro’s e↵ectiveness for binaries compiled from C++ programs. Moreover, there are much less indirect jumps than indirect calls, indicating
they are likely to have less impact on runtime overhead. Note that a small number
of indirect jumps does not imply an equally small number of potential indirect jump
1

We exclude indirect calls to external library functions through import address table (IAT), as these
external targets are not handled by our redirection mechanisms.

Instr.
Count

19825
54595
337033
20566
65375
44554
114249
164093
129464
132034
21360
64669
143679
23353
21824
61214
-

107220
561626
272434
273710
230234
-

Binary

164.gzip
175.vpr
176.gcc
181.mcf
186.crafty
197.parser
252.eon
253.perlbmk
254.gap
255.vortex
256.bzip2
300.twolf
177.mesa
179.art
183.equake
188.ammp
Average

putty
gvim
notepad++
Adobe Reader
Chrome
Average

57
294
159
146
82
-

19
53
456
36
56
36
50
148
35
66
36
41
211
38
38
39
-

Indirect
Jumps

662
5111
4302
2543
1280
-

103
106
260
103
130
112
441
211
1357
145
101
106
552
103
101
128
-

Indirect
Calls
(23.47%)
(13.54%)
(7.03%)
(17.36%)
(9.29%)
(17.42%)
(75.53%)
(23.04%)
(76.59%)
(15.92%)
(17.24%)
(15.54%)
(17.68%)
(17.45%)
(18.49%)
(31.25%)
(24.80%)

942: 291 (30.89%)
3893: 1004 (25.79%)
4897: 2695 (55.03%)
3635: 2160 (59.42%)
1842: 933 (50.65%)
- (44.36%)

98: 23
229: 31
3855: 271
144: 25
312: 29
155: 27
1659: 1253
2166: 499
816: 625
446: 71
145: 25
193: 30
2675: 473
149: 26
146: 27
224: 70
-

Call/Jump Targets:
Anchors(%)

Data Blocks:
File Size (KB)
Data Anchors(%) Orig: Stch’ed growth(%)
SPEC CPU 2000 benchmarks
163: 1 (0.61%)
86.5: 98.5
13.87%
404: 1 (0.25%)
232: 248.5
7.11%
2580: 14 (0.54%)
1264: 1393
10.21%
100: 2 (2.00%)
76.5: 85.5
11.76%
247: 1 (0.40%)
283: 298.5
5.48%
463: 1 (0.22%)
164: 173.5
5.79%
1455: 1 (0.07%)
499: 575
15.23%
1293: 6 (0.46%)
626: 743
18.69%
1142: 1 (0.09%)
452.5: 492
8.73%
738: 1 (0.14%)
561: 585
4.28%
150: 1 (0.67%)
87.5: 99
13.14%
391: 2 (0.51%)
253: 263
3.95%
942: 5 (0.53%)
549.5: 652.5
18.74%
103: 2 (1.94%)
85.5: 94.5
10.53%
116: 1 (0.86%)
88.5: 97
9.6%
279: 1 (0.36%)
235.5: 245.5
4.25%
- (0.60%)
10.09%
Real-world Windows-based Software
93: 1 (1.08%)
444: 496
11.71%
5081: 22 (0.43%)
1950.5: 2150
10.23%
3394: 7 (0.21%)
1584: 1864
17.68%
3037: 11 (0.36%) 1445.9: 1702.4
17.74%
930: 6 (0.65%)
1211: 1338
10.49%
- (0.55%)
13.57%
472: 524
2008: 2212
1660: 1940
1472: 1728
1240: 1368
-

424: 440
248: 268
1348: 1480
100: 108
1344: 1360
352: 360
592: 668
648: 764
896: 936
588: 612
172: 184
296: 304
568: 672
104: 112
104: 112
252: 264
-

11.02%
10.16%
16.87%
17.39%
10.32%
13.15%

3.77%
8.06%
9.79%
8%
1.19%
2.27%
12.84%
17.9%
4.46%
4.08%
6.98%
2.7%
18.31%
7.69%
7.69%
4.76%
7.53%

Initial Mem. Image Size (KB)
Orig: Stch’ed
growth(%)

83.2:
64.5:
33.3:
40.2:
38.2:
83.1:
42.7:
63.3:
35.4:
50.6:
73.4:
93.2:
64.9:
32:
26.1:
88.7:

-

84.6
64.6
33.9
40.4
38.9
83.5
44.7
67.9
37.2
51.1
74.6
93.6
65.6
32.3
26.1
88.3
-

-

1.68%
0.16%
1.8%
0.5%
1.83%
0.48%
4.68%
7.27%
5.08%
0.99%
1.63%
0.43%
1.08%
0.94%
0%
1.92%
1.90%

Run Time (s)
Orig: Stch’ed overhead(%)

Table 2.1.: Performance results of stretching Windows software and SPEC CPU 2000 binaries.

0.865
2.121
1.480
1.556
1.391
-

0.752
0.755
1.420
0.685
0.935
0.754
0.950
1.118
1.001
1.050
0.714
0.809
0.990
0.690
0.720
0.780
-

Stretching
Time (s)
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targets. In fact, due to the difficulty of identifying jump table boundaries, we conservatively consider any constant in a binary that appears to be an instruction address
as a potential jump target. The large number of potential jump targets and the low
impact on performance justify our design choice of using the slightly more expensive
but more flexible dynamic target translation scheme (Section 2.5.2), compared to the
anchor scheme (Section 2.5.1).
The Call/Jump Targets: Anchors column shows the number of potential indirect
call/jump targets, the number of anchors generated, and their comparison. Observe
that the number of anchors created is small, compared to the size of the potential
set. For binaries from C++ programs, due to the heavy use of virtual methods,
it is not a surprise to see many anchors created. The Data Blocks: Data Anchors
column shows that only less than 1% of all data blocks need to be preserved at their
original locations using anchors. From the File Size columns, we can see Bistro
only increases the file size by 10.1% on average for SPEC programs, and 13.6% for
application binaries. The overhead is dominated by the perfect hash tables. The
Initial Mem. Image Size columns show the initial memory consumption when the
binary is loaded into memory, which increases by only 7.5% on average for SPEC
programs and 13.2% for application programs. Note that Bistro does not cause any
additional memory overhead during execution. The Run Time columns present the
runtime overhead, which is only 1.9% on average. Except eon, perlbmk and gap, all
SPEC binaries have less than 2% overhead. The last column Stretching Time shows
the stretching time of Bistro. The time is consistently short, implying that Bistro
can stretch a binary at runtime when it is loaded.

2.7.2 Case Study I: Binary-level Semantic Patching Using BISTRO
Code reuse is a common practice in software development. One popular approach
is to directly compile and statically link a piece of re-usable code with the target
software – either directly in the executable or in some private library – to make
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the software self-contained, avoid compatibility problems, and improve performance.
Indeed, developers of many popular programs (e.g., chrome and firefox) reuse code
this way. The consequence is that programs reusing the same code may have the code
placed at di↵erent locations in their address spaces. The reused code may not even
have the same instructions if compiled by di↵erent compilers.
However, code reuse via static linking introduces a security liability: When a
piece of re-usable code contains a vulnerability, all programs that reuse the code will
su↵er from the same vulnerability. If these programs have been shipped in binary
forms, the only way to fix the vulnerability is to release multiple binary patches –
one for each program and by the corresponding vendor. However, not all vendors
react to a vulnerability with equal timeliness and some may not even be aware of the
vulnerability not in their own code. Thus it may be desirable for customers, who do
not have source code access, to patch these programs without vendors’ involvement.
Binary syntactic patching, which directly applies a patch for software A to software
B sharing the same (vulnerable) code, will hardly work, because of the di↵erent
locations of the code and the syntactic di↵erences between the two code copies (due
to di↵erent compilers used or di↵erent call/jump targets inside the copies).
In our first case study, we show that Bistro can enable binary semantic patching.
Assume that software A and B share a function f and the vendor of A has released
a binary patch of f for a vulnerability. Let the patched program and the patched
function be A0 and f 0 , respectively. We will use Bistro to extract f 0 from A0 and
embed it to B to replace the vulnerable version. Note that Bistro is critical in
ensuring the extracted f 0 is properly patched and the target binary B is properly
stretched to contain f 0 .
We acquire a group of application binaries that leverage the same vulnerable
component using public, vendor-provided information (e.g., which libraries are used
in the software) or by finding similar binary snippets using the binary comparison
tool bindi↵ [48]. Suppose at least one binary in the group, say A, has a patched

SA48772 /
CVE-2012-0278
SA49091

SA47388

Firefox 3.6.6 (xul.dll)
Zoner Photo Studio 15 (Zxl.dll)
XnView 1.99.5 (Xfpx.dll)
LeadTools 17.5 (ltkdku.dll)
IrfanView 4.35 (Fpx.dll)
LeadTools 17.5 (ltkdku.dll)
XnView 1.99.5 (Xfpx.dll)
LeadTools 17.5 (ltkdku.dll)
LeadTools 17.5 (ltkdku.dll)

libpng 1.2.43 ! 1.2.44 (rpng2-win.exe)
libpng 1.4.8 ! 1.4.9 (rpng2-win.exe)

CVE-2010-1205
CVE-2011-3026
SA47322 /
CVE-2012-0025

XnView 1.98.8 ! 1.99 (Xfpx.dll)

IrfanView 4.33 ! 4.34 (Fpx.dll)

XnView 1.98.5 ! 1.98.8 (Xfpx.dll)

IrfanView 4.30 ! 4.32 (Fpx.dll)

Vulnerable Application Patched

Patch Extracted From

Vulnerability

Original File
Size (KB)
11747.5
8225.1
356
138.5
432
372.5
356
138.5
372.5

Patched File Size (KB)
w. / w.o. Reloc
12371.5 / 13005
8502.1 / 9181.6
368 / 400
143 / 151
448 / 508
428.5 / 493.5
368 / 400
142.5 / 150.5
428.5 / 488.5

Table 2.2.: Results of binary semantic patching using Bistro.
Semantic Patch
Available
6/25/2010
2/18/2012
12/20/2011
12/20/2011
3/12/2012
3/12/2012
4/13/2012
4/13/2012
6/15/2012

Vendor Patch
Available
7/20/2010
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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version A0 . Our goal is to extract a semantic patch out of A0 and transplant it to
patch the other vulnerable binaries {B1 , ..., Bn }.
We collect 6 real-world vulnerabilities, with their CVE or Secunia IDs shown in
Column 1 of Table 2.2. For each vulnerability, the vulnerable program(s) that has
been patched by its vendor is shown in Column 2. The file names in braces represent
the files that are patched. Column 3 shows a list of other un-patched programs with
the same vulnerabilities. Column 6 shows the patch release date for the application
in Column 2, i.e. the earliest date we can extract the semantic patch. Column 7
shows the date when the vendors for the software in Column 3 release their patches
(N/A means no vendor patch is available yet). Most of the applications used in this
case study are close-source (except libpng and firefox). Observe that most of the
applications in Column 3 do not have vendor patches so far. For firefox, the new
version (3.6.7) which patched the vulnerability was released – but with a one-month
latency. With Bistro, we can fix all these vulnerable applications as soon as one
vendor releases the corresponding patch.
Failure of Syntactic Patching. We first verify that simple syntactic patching
does not work – that is, using an existing binary di↵erencing tool that generates
and applies patches (e.g., xdelta, bsdi↵, bspatch, etc.) will not properly patch B1...n .
For each vulnerability in Table 2.2, we use bsdi↵ to extract the syntactic di↵erence
between the pair of shared functions (f and f 0 ) in the versions in Column 2 as a patch,
and use bspatch to apply it to the corresponding vulnerable applications in Column 3.
None of the resultant binaries works. Further inspection shows that syntactic patches
cannot properly fix the call/jump targets that are di↵erent among copies of the same
reused code.
Function Identification. To extract the semantic patch for a specific vulnerability,
we need to identify the functions in A and A0 that are related to the vulnerability. To
illustrate, we denote the set of functions in a binary A by FA . First, we notice that the
related functions must exist in all the vulnerable binaries. We take A and the other
vulnerable binaries {B1 , ..., Bn } and use bindi↵ [48] to identify the set of common
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functions F among them (Equation (2.1) below). However, some functions in F are
not related to the vulnerability (e.g., other pieces of reused code.) To pinpoint the
relevant functions in F , we leverage the observation that they have been patched
in A0 . Particularly, we utilize the partial matching feature of bindi↵ to identify the
relevant patched functions as shown in Equation (2.2). The generated M is a mapping
that maps a function f 2 F to its patched version f 0 2 FA0 . Two functions are said
to be partially matched when they share similar characteristics (e.g., common basic
blocks, similar CFG) but are not exactly the same. By performing partial matching
between F and FA0 , we also exclude patches in A0 that are not related to the target
vulnerability. Note that a vendor may patch a few (unrelated) problems in a single
release.
F = FA \ FB1 \ FB2 ... \ FBn

(2.1)

M = BinDi↵ Partial Matching(F, FA0 )

(2.2)

Patch Transplanting. We have developed a binary semantic patching tool based
on Bistro and bindi↵. The extraction and application of the patch is guided by
mapping function M . For each mapping under M : (f, f 0 2 FA0 ), we use Bistro to
extract f 0 from A0 as the semantic patch for f . For each vulnerable binary B, we use
bindi↵ to find f . We use Bistro to cut out f and then stretch the resulting binary
to implant f 0 at the same starting address of f . Bistro ensures the correctness
of both f 0 and the patched binary B 0 by properly stretching and patching control
transfer instructions and data references. Our patching tool tries to avoid extracting
dependent functions or global data entries of f 0 (i.e., functions being called and global
data accessed by f 0 ) as much as possible by redirecting them to their counterparts in
the target binary B. Since f 0 is a patched version of f , they likely share the same
dependencies. For example, for each function invocation to function g 0 inside f 0 , if
bindi↵ is able to identify the matching function g in B, our tool will automatically
redirect the invocation in the extracted patch to g, without extracting g 0 . To be
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conservative, g and g 0 must be fully matched. Otherwise, g 0 will be extracted as part
of the semantic patch.
We evaluate our patching tool on the subjects in Table 2.2. We apply our tool in
two di↵erent ways to stress-test the robustness of Bistro: first, we use the relocation information when it is present in the binary; second, we do not use relocation
information at all. The patches are not large, each consisting of tens to hundreds
of instructions. However, it is not straightforward to generate them because of the
nature of the vulnerabilities being patched. In both runs, the patching is successful: the patched applications work well and no longer su↵er from the corresponding
vulnerabilities. Columns 4 and 5 show the file size changes.
The first two vulnerabilities are in libpng, which is widely used in various software
to read, write and render PNG images. The two vulnerable applications in Column 3
have libpng statically linked in their private DLLs (xul.dll and Zxl.dll). To patch these
DLLs, we extract the semantic patch from rpng2-win.exe, a sample application in the
libpng package. The remaining four vulnerabilities lie in libfpx, a library to handle
the Flashpix (.fpx) image format. For the four vulnerabilities, only the first one was
patched by the maintainer of libfpx; the other three were patched by individual developers who use libfpx. However, as shown in the table, individual developers only care
about patching the libfpx code in their own applications. Using our binary semantic
patching tool, users of the un-patched applications can transplant the patches and
eliminate the vulnerabilities without the help of application developers.

2.7.3 Case Study II: Malware Stitching Using BISTRO
In the second case study, we demonstrate how Bistro helps in the study of
cyber attacks and counter-attacks. Specifically, we use Bistro to compose a new,
executable malware by stitching 3 separate functional components extracted from a
non-executable sample of the Conficker worm [45]. It is an unpacked version without
relocation information. Based on the published technical report of Conficker [45] and
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manual code inspection, we identify the code and data associated with the following
3 components:
• DNS API hijacking. This component prevent DNS query of the web sites in
a blacklist by hijacking the functions Query Main, DNSQuery A, DNSQuery W
and DNSQuery UTF8 in dnsapi.dll. The result is these web sites will not be
accessible using their domain names.
• Code injection. To hijack the functions in dnsapi.dll used by a process (e.g.,
Internet Explorer), the malware must inject itself into the address space of the
process. This component performs the injection. It takes the process identifier
(PID) of the target process and the path of the malware as parameters.
• Process identification. This component gets a process’ PID using its process
name and provide the PID to the code injection component.
The identification process takes us about 60 minutes. After that we use Bistro
to extract the three components from the Conficker sample. We then create a dummy
DLL to serve as the container of these components. Next, we use Bistro to embed the
3 components into the empty DLL, right before the DllMain() function. After that,
we add instructions to the DllMain() function to invoke the inserted components.
The invocation code first checks if the current process is the target process. If so, it
will invoke the DNS API hijacking component to hijack the DNS query. If not, it
will call the process identification component to find the PID of the target process,
and then call the DLL injection component to inject itself into the target process for
DNS API hijacking. The whole composition process takes us about 30 minutes.
To verify the functionality of the newly composed malware, we select two applications as our targets (in two experiment runs): Internet Explorer and FlashFXP (an
FTP client). After being loaded, the malware injects itself into the target processes.
Then, in the target application, we try to access web site avast.com, which is blacklisted by Conficker [45]. Interestingly, the access was not blocked at first (namely,
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the malware did not succeed). After debugging, we found that it was due to a bug in
Conficker’s original code: the hijacked DNSQuery W() has one unnecessary instruction which sets a wrong return value. We point out that we would not have spotted the
problem, had we not made these components executable and observed their runtime
behavior. After removing this instruction using Bistro, both IE and FlashFXP are
successfully compromised: they can no longer access avast.com due to a DNS query
error.

2.7.4 Case Study III: Trojan-ing Kernel Drivers

Table 2.3.: Trojan-ed device drivers (two per row).
Original Driver

File Name

File Size(KB)

Beep
FAT File System
NT File System
Intel E1000 Network Adapter
Logitech C500 Webcam

beep.sys
ftdisk.sys
ntfs.sys
e1000325.sys
LVPr2Mon.sys

4.1
122.1
561.1
167.1
25

w/ proc hider embedded
File size(KB)
Work?
p
7.9
p
135.1
p
595.3
p
175.4
p
31.4

w/ keylogger embedded
File size(KB)
Work?
p
12.4
p
137.5
p
598
p
180.6
p
33.8

In the third case study, we demonstrate the use of Bistro in transplanting malicious modules from existing kernel rootkits to existing kernel-level device drivers.
The trojan-ed kernel drivers will execute the rootkit modules while performing their
original functionalities. The goal of this case study is two-fold: (1) to evaluate the
e↵ectiveness of Bistro for kernel-level binaries, (2) to show the possibility and ease
of composing – instead of implementing from scratch – device drivers with hidden and
possibly malicious logic. Such trojan-ed device drivers are more difficult to detect and
clean up, compared with traditional rootkits that come as stand-alone kernel modules.
On the flip side, trojan-ed kernel drivers can also be leveraged in defensive missions,
such as honeypot deployment, to achieve better stealthiness in attack monitoring and
containment. For example, malware may try to aggressively detect and disable any
monitoring kernel module (e.g., Sebek). With Bistro, one could transplant stealthy
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monitoring/logging functions into a general-purpose device driver, making them more
difficult to detect and disable.
In this case study, the two Windows-based kernel rootkits tested are captured
variants of HookSSDTMDL and Klog which were originally packed in the wild, without
relocation information for the rootkit code. The packers use their own algorithms to
perform rootkit code relocation, and such relocation information is lost after the
rootkits are unpacked. The samples we obtained are the unpacked version. We wish
to extract two modules from the samples (one from each): (1) proc hider for hiding
processes and (2) keylogger for logging keystrokes. To show the generality of device
driver trojan-ing, we transplant these two rootkit modules into 5 di↵erent Windowsbased kernel drivers, resulting in a total of 10 trojan-ed kernel drivers.
First, we use an approach similar to [44, 47] to identify the modules to extract.
We then use Bistro to shrink each of the two kernel rootkits so that only the code
of the two modules and the data they access remain (as snippets). The size of the
extracted snippets is 2.3KB for proc hider and 7KB for keylogger, respectively. The
size of the data in the extracted snippets is 169 bytes and 514 bytes, respectively.
After preparing the snippets, we use Bistro to insert each of them into each of the
following five drivers: beep.sys, ftdisk.sys, ntfs.sys, e1000325.sys and LVPr2Mon.sys.
The OS is Windows XP (SP2)2 . Table 2.3 lists the 10 resultant trojan-ed drivers (two
per row). For each of the 10 drivers, we install it and confirm the proper working of
(1) the original driver functionalities and (2) the malicious rootkit module.
When determining where to insert a rootkit module, we choose to insert it right
before a randomly chosen function in the driver. To invoke the rootkit module when
the driver is loaded, we insert a call to the rootkit module in the DriverEntry ()
function of the driver, which is a mandatory function exported by any driver and can
be located in the code section by reading the export table. Interestingly, we are able
to use Bistro to implement a “timebomb”-style invocation of the rootkit module:
Instead of activating the module upon driver loading, we wish to invoke it only under
2

We use Windows XP because the real-world rootkits we obtained do not work with newer versions.
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a certain condition. Specifically, when we trojan the NT file system driver (ntfs.sys)
with the keylogger module, we want to activate the keylogger only when a file with
the word “secret” in its name is opened. This is done by calling a file-name-matching
function before activating the keylogger. We write this function using C, compile it
into a binary snippet, and use Bistro to insert it into ntfs.sys (just like inserting
the rootkit module), particularly, inside NtfsFsdCreate (), a function that is called
every time a file is opened. Here, we leverage IDA-Pro to spot this function, which
is the IRP dispatch routine to handle IRP MJ CREATE IRPs. This can be easily done
by finding the initialization of the IRP dispatch table in DriverEntry (). We verify
that the timebomb-controlled trojan-ed driver works as expected.
We observe that, for a “native” driver developed by the OS vendor (e.g., beep.sys,
ftdisk.sys and ntfs.sys), the installation of the trojan-ed version does raise an alert
to the user, thanks to the built-in integrity check mechanism in the OS. Unfortunately, if the user chooses to ignore the alert, the installation will proceed and the
system will never complain again. For third-party drivers (e.g., e1000325.sys and
LVPr2Mon.sys), the detection of maliciously trojan-ed version is much more difficult
because these drivers may be widely distributed and frequently updated without a
centralized authority. Even if such an authority exists and performs digital signing
for its drivers, authors of trojan-ed drivers may still evade detection by stealing certificates from the authority to sign their trojan-ed drivers, as was done in the crafting
of Stuxnet [56]. In our study, the installations of the trojan-ed third-party drivers
did not trigger any warnings.

2.8 Limitation
Bistro cannot work on self-modifying, self-checking or obfuscated binaries. Selfmodifying binaries generate instructions dynamically during runtime, which could
not be statically patched using Bistro. Self-checking binaries use checksum or other
integrity checks to detect changes made to their code by Bistro, thus may refuse to
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run properly. Obfuscated binaries in many cases cannot be properly disassembled.
For instance, the attacker can craft a conditional jump, with one branch never taken
but pointing to a data entry. A disassembler will have trouble handling such binaries
as it does not know statically that one of the branches cannot be taken. However, we
note that all other static binary rewriting/instrumentation techniques face the same
challenge.
Our anchor and branch target set pruning criteria assume the constants in a binary
represent a superset of all possible indirect control transfer targets. This assumption
should hold for binaries generated by common compilers. One exception is position
independent code (PIC), which obtains addresses at runtime and use them to compute
indirect control transfer targets. All PIC we encountered has the form of making a
call and then obtain the return address from the stack (e.g., call $+5; pop eax), which
is the address of the instruction right after the call. We identify all such instructions
and insert snippets to adjust the addresses to their mapped addresses. Also, special
compilers or hand-written binaries might violate our assumption. For example, in
the instruction sequence mov eax, Target; add eax, 5; jmp eax, the actual target is
Target +5 instead of the constant Target; our pruning heuristic will miss the actual
target. For such binaries, we can choose not to prune the anchor set or the branch
target set, which will consume more memory but guarantee correctness.

2.9 Related Work
The most related work is discussed in Section 2.1 (with details in Section 2.3.) In
this section, we discuss other related work in the general area of binary manipulation.
Static Binary Rewriting. Static binary rewriting is widely applied in many scenarios, such as in-lined reference monitors [57], software fault isolation [46,58–60], binary
instrumentation [1, 2, 4, 6–8], binary obfuscation [61, 62] and retrofitting security in
legacy binaries [9, 63]. Most of these rewriters require the binary to be compiled by
specific compilers, or contains symbolic information.
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PEBIL [8], REINS [57], STIR [10] and SecondWrite [9] are recently developed
rewriters targeting stripped binaries. However, they all aim at rewriting a single
binary, so they all keep the original code and data sections in place. In contrast,
Bistro supports “transplanting” binary components from one or more binaries to
a target binary, which requires rewriting and combining multiple binaries. Keeping
original code and data sections in place may result in address space conflicts and hence
is not an option for Bistro. Detour-based techniques [5–7] are lightweight and can
work on stripped binaries. However, they cannot patch non-trivial jumps/calls that
are repositioned.
Dynamic Binary Rewriting. Dynamic binary rewriters [17,19,20,41] are generally
more robust as they do not require specific compilers or symbolic information. It is
possible to apply them to conduct binary stretching and transplanting. However, we
choose to use a static approach mainly because of the following two reasons: (1) Dynamic binary rewriters usually have much higher run time overhead than static ones.
(2) It is more difficult to deploy a instrumented binary using dynamic approaches, as
the rewriter itself must be deployed along with the binary.
Binary Component Identification, Extraction and Reuse. Researchers proposed to identify, extract and reuse components from binaries for security scenarios [42–44]. Kolbitsch et al. proposed Inspector Gadget [42], which performs dynamic
slicing on a malware binary to identify and extract the slice pertinent to a specific
malicious functionality, and wrap the slice into a stand-alone binary that could be
reused to execute the malicious functionality. Inspector Gadget is able to extract
component from self-modifying code, which is not supported by Bistro due to the
limitation of static binary manipulation. Using dynamic slicing, Inspector Gadget
also avoids the problem of handling indirect calls/jumps in Bistro as all call/jump
targets are directly known in the slice. However, the slice may not cover all possible
code paths, which could result in incorrect execution when the user provides an input that would lead to a code path which is not included in the slice. Compared to
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Inspector Gadget, Bistro statically extracts the component from the binary, which
involves handling of indirect calls/jumps but provides better code path coverage.
Caballero et al. proposed BCR [43] to identify and extract a function from a
binary using a combination of static and dynamic analysis. The extracted function,
in the format of disassembly, is wrapped in a C file to be reused. BCR statically
disassembles the designated function starting at its entry point; when encountering
indirect call/jumps, BCR utilizes dynamic execution trace to the find the call/jump
targets. During the extraction, BCR rewrites all calls/jumps to use labels. Using
labels implies that indirect call/jump can only have one target, which may not always
hold in practice. Although BCR specially handles indirect jumps that use jump tables,
there are other forms of multiple-target indirect calls/jumps such as function pointers
and vtables. Compared to BCR, Bistro preserves the original semantic of indirect
calls/jumps when performing the extraction, hence does not su↵er from this problem.
Neither Inspector Gadget nor BCR could extract components from non-executable
binaries (as in Section 2.7.3) because they are based on dynamic analysis. In such
case, Bistro can still perform the extraction statically. Moreover, neither Inspector
Gadget nor BCR supports reusing extracted components to enhance legacy binaries
(as in Section 2.7.2), as they lack the capability of embedding instructions that invoke
the components into the target binary. Bistro is able to handle such a scenario by
performing both binary component extraction and embedding.
Lin et al. proposed ROC [44] which uses dynamic slicing to identify reusable functional components in a binary for attack purposes. However, compared to Bistro,
ROC only reuses the components in the same binary; it does not support extraction
or reusing components in a di↵erent program.

2.10 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a new pair of binary program manipulation
primitives called BISTRO for extracting and re-packaging a functional component
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from a binary program; and for embedding a functional component in a target binary
program, respectively. We address the challenges of patching control transfer instructions and data references to preserve the semantics of both the extracted component
and the stretched binary program, especially indirect calls and jumps. BISTRO incurs
low runtime overhead (1.9% on average) and small space overhead (11% on average).
The extraction and embedding operations are highly efficient, with less than 1.5s
for most cases. We have applied BISTRO to three security application scenarios,
demonstrating its efficiency, precision, and versatility.
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3 SPIDER: STEALTHY BINARY INSTRUMENTATION VIA HARDWARE
VIRTUALIZATION
3.1 Introduction
In a wide range of security scenarios, researchers need to trap the execution of a
binary program, legitimate or malicious, at desired instructions to perform certain
actions. For example, in high accuracy attack provenance, instruction-level trapping
allows recording of events which are more fine-grained than system calls and library
calls. In malware analysis, where malware often includes large number of garbage
instructions to hamper analysis, it allows analysts to skip such instructions and focus
on the instructions that are related to the behavior of malware.
Debuggers [12–14] and dynamic instrumentation tools [17–22] both support efficient instruction-level trapping. As a countermeasure, an increasing percent of malware is equipped with anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation techniques. Such
techniques are also commonly used in legitimate software for protection purpose [64].
While they do prevent reverse-engineering and software modification, they also render any security application that relies on instruction-level trapping infeasible at the
same time.
Researchers have proposed to build systems that enable transparent trapping to
solve the problem. However, existing approaches are insufficient to support transparent, efficient and flexible instruction-level trapping. In-guest approaches [15, 16]
could be detected by program running in the same privilege level. Emulation based
approaches [25,26] are not transparent enough due to imperfect emulation. Hardware
virtualization based systems [27, 50, 65–67] provide better transparency. However,
none of them supports instruction-level trapping with both flexibility and efficiency.
Some of them utilize single-stepping which results in prohibitive performance over-
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head; others could trap only a certain subset of instructions. More detailed discussion
about existing work is presented in Section 4.7.
In this chapter, we present Spider, a stealthy program instrumentation and debugging framework built upon hardware virtualization. We propose a novel primitive
called invisible breakpoint to support transparent, efficient and flexible trapping of
execution at any desired instruction in a program. Invisible breakpoint is an improvement over traditional software breakpoint, with all its side-e↵ects hidden from
the guest. Spider hides the existence of invisible breakpoint in the guest memory
by utilizing the Extended Page Table (EPT) to split the code and data view seen
by the guest, and handles invisible breakpoint at the hypervisor level to avoid any
unexpected in-guest execution. Spider also provides data watchpoint which enables
monitoring memory read/write at any address.
We have developed a prototype of Spider on KVM [68]. We have evaluated the
transparency of Spider using software protectors and programs equipped with stateof-the-art anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation techniques. The result shows that
Spider successfully maintains transparency against all of them. We have also applied Spider to the following cases: (1) We improve the applicability and security of
an existing attack provenance system [11] by replacing its underlying in-guest instrumentation engine with Spider; (2) We demonstrate a threat that involves stealthy
introspection on protected software to capture sensitive application data. The performance overhead introduced by Spider is less than 6% in our case studies. The
quantitative cost of each trap is around 3200 CPU cycles according to our measurement, which is less than a previous work [15] and comparable with hardware
breakpoint.

3.2 Related Work
In this section, we take an in-depth look at existing program debugging, instrumentation and analysis tools and discuss their limitations. We only focus on
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instruction-level tools as they are most related to Spider. We classify them into four
categories: in-guest, emulation based, hardware virtualization based and hybrid.
In-Guest Approaches. Traditional in-guest debuggers [12–14] use software and
hardware breakpoints to gain control at arbitrary points during the execution of a
program. In x86, software breakpoint is implemented by replacing the target instruction with a special 1-byte instruction (int3 ), which triggers a #BP exception
upon its execution. Hardware breakpoints are implemented as four debug registers
(DR0-DR3 ). Each of these registers holds a target address; a #DB exception is
triggered upon instruction execution or data access at the target address. Software
breakpoints could be easily detected by code integrity checks as the instruction is
modified. Hardware breakpoints are not transparent either. The reason is that they
are limited resource such that programs could hold and use all hardware breakpoints
exclusively to prevent debuggers from using them.
To solve the transparency issue of traditional breakpoints, researchers proposed
to use page-level mechanism to trap execution of arbitrary instruction [15, 16]. The
page which contains the target instruction is set to non-present, which will cause a
page fault upon execution. In the page fault handler, the page is set to present and
the target instruction is executed in single-step mode. Then the page is set back to
non-present to enable breakpoint again. There are two limitations with this approach.
First, execution of any instruction in the non-present page will cause a page fault, even
if there is no breakpoint set on that instruction. This would result in prohibitively
high performance overhead. Second, although it is not as straightforward as detecting
traditional breakpoints, the modified page table and page fault handler could still be
detected by kernel-level programs.
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) frameworks [17–22] are able to insert instrumentation code at arbitrary points during the execution of a program. The mechanism of DBI frameworks is to relocate and instrument code blocks dynamically and
handle control flow transitions between basic blocks. Transparency is an important
concern in DBI frameworks. For example, position-independent code makes assump-
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tion about relative o↵sets between instructions and/or data. DBI frameworks may
break such assumptions when relocating basic blocks, so they must change some instructions in the program to create an illusion that every address is the same as in a
native run. However, despite recent e↵orts [23, 24] targeting at improving the transparency of DBI frameworks, they are still insufficient. A recent work [69] has also
shown that there are a number of ways to detect DBI frameworks. More essentially,
the DBI framework itself, along with the relocated and instrumented basic blocks
must occupy additional memory in the virtual address space. Programs could scan
the virtual address space to detect unsolicited memory consumption and hence the
DBI framework.
Emulation Based Approaches. To get rid of in-guest components that are visible to guest programs, researchers have proposed to build program analysis and
instrumentation tools [25, 26] using full system emulators such as QEMU [41] and
Bochs [70]. Full system emulators create a virtual environment for the guest so it
feels like running in a dedicated machine. Instruction-level trapping could be easily
implemented as each instruction is emulated. However, attackers have been able to
identify various methods [71–73] to detect emulators by exploiting imperfect emulation of instructions and hardware events (e.g. interrupts and exceptions). Although
imperfection that is already known could be fixed, the problem still exists as long
as there might be unrevealed imperfections. In fact, it has been proved in [50] that
determining whether an emulator achieves perfect emulation is undecidable.
Hardware Virtualization Based Approaches. With recent advances in processor
features, researchers propose to leverage hardware virtualization to construct more
transparent program analysis and instrumentation tools [27, 50, 65–67]. Hardware
virtualization naturally provides better transparency than emulation by executing all
guest instructions natively on processor.
Among existing hardware virtualization based approaches, none of them supports
transparent, efficient and flexible trapping of arbitrary instructions during execution
of a program. PinOS [27] implements a DBI framework on the Xen [74] hypervisor.
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As it needs to occupy part of the guest virtual address space, it su↵ers from the
same transparency issue as in-guest DBI frameworks. Ether [50] and MAVMM [65]
use single-stepping for instruction-level trapping, which triggers a transition between
hypervisor and guest upon execution of every guest instruction. Such transition causes
significant performance overhead as it costs hundreds to thousands cycles while an
instruction only costs several to tens cycles on average. The mechanism is not flexible
either as one is forced to single-step through the whole program even if he is only
interested in the states at specific points during execution. Such scenario is often
encountered when analyzing obfuscated programs, which contain lots of garbage code.
Several recent approaches [66,67,75] propose to use x86 processor features to trap
specific events for program analysis. In [66], the authors use branch tracing to record
all the branches taken by the program during its execution. While the performance
is much better than single-stepping, it is still 12 times slower than normal execution.
Also, the tool is only able to record all branches. It cannot trap a specific branch,
which renders detailed analysis at arbitrary given points during execution impossible.
In [67], the authors make use of performance monitoring counters (PMCs) to trap
certain types of instructions (e.g. call, ret and conditional branches). However, there
are still many other types of instructions (e.g. mov) that could not be trapped this
way. Also, the tool does not support trapping instruction at a specific location.
In [75], the authors propose to utilize the System Management Mode (SMM) in x86
to implement a debugging system with maximized transparency. However, when
performing instruction-level debugging, their system introduces more than 900 times
slowdown compared to a native execution, which is only usable for manual debugging
instead of instrumentation in production runs.
Hybrid Approaches. Researchers have also proposed to use hybrid approaches [28,
29] to take advantage of both the transparency granted by hardware virtualization and
the flexibility provided by emulation. In [28], the authors utilize the trace obtained
from a transparent reference system (e.g. Ether) to guide the execution of program
in an emulator. However, as discussed above, it incurs high performance overhead

46
to obtain execution trace using current hardware virtualization based approaches.
V2E [29] takes another approach by emulating only the instructions that can be
perfectly emulated. For other instructions in the program, it records the state changes
caused by these instructions in a hardware virtualization based system, and then
replays the state changes in the emulator. While this method could substantially
reduce performance overhead, how to precisely identify the set of instructions that
can be perfectly emulated remains a problem.

3.3 Overview
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Figure 3.1.: Overview of Spider.

The goal of Spider is to provide a program debugging and instrumentation framework with flexibility, efficiency, transparency and reliability, which we define as follows:
(R1) Flexibility: Spider should be able to trap the execution of the target program
at any desired instruction and data access at any memory address.
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(R2) Efficiency: Spider should not introduce high performance overhead on the
target program.
(R3) Transparency: The target program should not be able to detect the existence
of Spider.
(R4) Reliability: The trap should not be bypassed or tampered with by the target
program.
An overview of Spider is shown in Figure 4.3. For simplicity, we only show
the trapping of instruction execution here. The trapping of data access using data
watchpoint (Section 3.4.5) is much simpler and omitted in the figure. To trap the
execution of an instruction, the user provides these inputs to Spider: the program
address space identifier (CR3 register value in x86), the virtual address to set trap and
the function to call on trap. As shown in the figure, Spider is mainly implemented
inside the Hypervisor. The guest virtual-to-physical mapping monitor component
(Section 3.4.3), which captures guest virtual-to-physical mapping changes, translates
the address space identifier and the virtual address into guest physical address and
invokes the breakpoint manager to set the trap. The breakpoint manager sets invisible
breakpoint to trap the execution of the target program.
Invisible breakpoint uses the same triggering mechanism as traditional software
breakpoint to inherit its flexibility (R1) and efficiency (R2). However, as discussed
in Section 4.7, traditional software breakpoint is not transparent because: (1) The
instructions needs to be modified in order to set breakpoint; (2) The triggering and
handling of the breakpoint involves control-flow which is di↵erent from natural execution. These side-e↵ects are neutralized in invisible breakpoint to guarantee transparency (R3). Regarding the first side-e↵ect, the breakpoint manager uses EPT to
split the code and data views (Section 3.4.1) of the guest physical page that contains
the breakpoint. In the code view, which is used for instruction fetching (shown as the
grey path in Figure 4.3), the instruction is modified to set breakpoint; in the data
view, which is used for read/write access (shown as the white path in Figure 4.3), the
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instruction is not modified at all, so the guest sees no change to the instruction. To
neutralize the second side-e↵ect, when a breakpoint is triggered, the breakpoint manager will capture the event, call the corresponding user-provided function and handle
the breakpoint transparently (Section 3.4.2) so that the control-flow in the guest is
the same as a natural execution. The code modification handler (Section 3.4.4) captures any modification made to the data view and synchronizes with the code view
to guarantee transparency (R3); it also makes sure the breakpoint is not maliciously
overwritten by the guest to guarantee reliability (R4).

3.4 Design
3.4.1 Splitting Code and Data View
Spider neutralizes memory side-e↵ects of traditional software breakpoint by splitting the code and the data views of guest pages. Several existing techniques could
have been used here to split the two views; however, they all have some limitations.
For example, one could intercept all read accesses to modified instructions by setting the corresponding pages to not-present, and return original instructions upon
read accesses. However, it would introduce significant performance overhead as every instruction fetching or data access in these pages will cause a page fault. A
recent work hvmHarvard [76] tries to implement a Harvard architecture on x86 by
de-synchronizing the instruction TLB (iTLB) and the data TLB (dTLB). More specifically, it tries to maintain two di↵erent virtual-to-physical page mappings in iTLB and
dTLB for the code and data view respectively. To prevent the mapping of the code
view from being loaded into dTLB, the page table is set to map the data view all
the time; the code view is only mapped when an instruction fetching happens, and a
single-step is performed in the guest to load the code view into iTLB. Unfortunately,
such mechanism could not guarantee the de-synchronization of iTLB and dTLB. As
the code view is readable, one could still load the code view into dTLB by executing
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an instruction that reads from the page that contains it. An attacker could exploit
this limitation to read from the code view and detect the modified instructions.
Spider splits the code and the data views of a guest physical page by mapping
it to two host physical pages with mutually exclusive attributes. We call such guest
physical page with split code and data views a split page. The code view of a split
page is executable but not readable; the data view is readable but not executable.
Both views are set to not writable to handle code modification, which will be discussed in Section 3.4.4. The mutually exclusive attributes ensure that the guest could
neither read from the code view nor execute instruction from the data view of a split
page. Traditionally, in x86 there is no way to set a page to executable but not readable; however, recent processors introduces a feature that allows one to specify such
attribute in EPT entries [77]. Legacy page table still lacks such capability, which is
the reason we split physical pages instead of virtual pages.
Spider performs on-demand transparent switching between the two views of a
split page. For example, let us assume its corresponding EPT entry is currently set
to mapping its code view. When a data access happens in the page, since its current
view—code view is not readable, an EPT violation will occur. Spider will capture
the event and adjust the mapping and the attribute in the EPT entry to switch to the
data view. It will then resume the guest, and the data access can proceed. Switching
from data view to code view works in a similar way.
It seems that Spider needs to switch views frequently when instruction fetching
and data access in a split page are interleaved, which could result in a lot of EPT
violations. However, the problem is greatly mitigated by the separation of iTLB and
dTLB in x86. Given a split page, although the corresponding EPT entry could only
map one of its views at any given time, the mappings of the two views can exist
simultaneously in the iTLB and dTLB, respectively. For example, when Spider
switches the page from the code view to the data view due to a data access, the
mapping in the EPT is set to mapping its data view. After resuming the guest, the
data access will populate the dTLB with the mapping for the data view. However,
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the mapping for its code view still exists in the iTLB. Further instruction fetching
will not cause any EPT violation until the mapping is evicted from iTLB.

3.4.2 Handling Breakpoints
Spider hides the #BP exceptions generated by invisible breakpoints and invokes
breakpoint handlers at the hypervisor level to neutralize side-e↵ects related to breakpoint handling. Spider sets the hypervisor to intercept all #BP exceptions generated
by the guest. How to deal with intercepted #BP exceptions depends on their causes:
those caused by invisible breakpoints should not be seen by the guest, while those
caused by traditional software breakpoints set by the guest should be passed on to
the guest transparently.
The breakpoint manager of Spider maintains a list which stores the guest physical addresses of all invisible breakpoints and their associated handlers that should be
called when they are triggered. When Spider intercepts a #BP exception, it translates the guest instruction pointer to guest physical address by looking up the guest
page table, and compares the address against the list to see whether the triggered
breakpoint is an invisible breakpoint or a traditional software breakpoint. If it is a
traditional breakpoint, the #BP exception will be re-injected to the guest to let the
guest handle the breakpoint on its own. Otherwise, if it is an invisible breakpoint,
Spider will call its associated handler to handle the breakpoint event. After that,
Spider will temporarily clear the breakpoint and restore the first byte of instruction
which had been replaced. Then it lets the guest single-step through the instruction.
Unlike previous work [50, 65, 76] which enables single-stepping by setting the trap
flag in the guest EFLAGS register, Spider uses the monitor trap flag (MTF) which
is a flag specifically designed for single-stepping in hardware virtualization. When
MTF is set, the guest will trigger a VM Exit after executing each instruction. The
reason why we choose not to use trap flag is that it is visible to the guest as a flag in
a guest register. Despite various techniques used in previous work to hide the trap
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flag, the guest could still see it. For example, if an interrupt is pending right after
the guest resumes execution, the processor will invoke the corresponding interrupt
handler before single-stepping through the instruction. The EFLAGS register is
saved onto the stack, and restored after the interrupt handler returns. The interrupt
handler could check the EFLAGS on the stack to see if the trap flag has been set.
Compared with the trap flag, MTF is transparent because it could not be read by the
guest. However, using MTF also causes one problem. Consider the same scenario of
pending interrupt as above: when using the trap flag, the saving/restoring of the trap
flag implicitly avoids single-stepping through the interrupt handler; but when using
MTF, the processor will single-step through the interrupt handler before reaching the
instruction. Spider solves this problem by “retrying”: if it finds out that the guest
has not executed the instruction after a single-step, it will clear MTF, set the invisible
breakpoint again and resume the guest. The invisible breakpoint will be triggered
again after the interrupt handler returns. This procedure repeats until the instruction
is successfully executed after a single-step, and Spider will then clear MTF, set the
invisible breakpoint again and resume the execution of the guest.

3.4.3 Monitoring Virtual-to-Physical Mapping
The invisible breakpoint provides Spider the ability to trap the execution of
program at arbitrary guest physical address. However, when paging is enabled in
the guest, the processor uses virtual address instead of physical address to reference
memory. As paging is used by almost all modern operating systems, it is more
desirable to have the ability to trap the execution of program at arbitrary guest
virtual address in the program’s address space. We define the breakpoint address
where we want to set a breakpoint using a tuple of the address space identifier and
the guest virtual address. In x86, the physical address of the base of the top-level
paging structure (stored in CR3 register) serves as the address space identifier, so we
write the breakpoint address as BA = (P GB, GV A). If BA is mapped to a guest
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Figure 3.2.: Monitoring guest virtual-to-physical mapping.

physical address GP A, we denote it as BA ! GP A. If BA is not mapped to any
guest physical address, we denote it as BA ! N IL.
To illustrate, assume the user wants to set a breakpoint at BA1 = (P GB1 , GV A1 ).
If BA1 ! GP A1 , then we could just set an invisible breakpoint at GP A1 to solve the
problem. However, it is possible that BA1 ! N IL when we set the breakpoint (e.g.,
the program has not been loaded). Even if BA1 is mapped, the mapping could change
after the breakpoint is set. If the mapping changes to BA1 ! GP A2 , since there is
no breakpoint set at GP A2 , execution of the instruction at BA1 will not be trapped
as expected. Similarly, when BA1 is no longer mapped to GP A1 , the breakpoint
set at GP A1 will cause problem when another address is mapped to GP A1 . Such
virtual-to-physical mapping changes could happen for various reasons. For example,
when the guest OS swaps out a virtual page, its corresponding physical page might
be used to map another virtual page; when a write access happens in a copy-onwrite virtual page, the guest OS will map it to another physical page to perform
the writing; kernel-level malware could even modify the guest page table directly
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to change virtual-to-physical mappings. Hence, Spider must monitor virtual-tophysical mapping changes to handle such scenarios correctly.
Monitoring every change of virtual-to-physical mapping requires heavy-weight
techniques such as shadow page table. Fortunately, Spider only needs to monitor the change of virtual-to-physical mapping at each breakpoint address. In x86, the
virtual-to-physical mapping is represented using multiple levels of paging structures.
The number of levels depends on the operation mode of the processor, for example,
whether physical address extension (PAE) or long mode is enabled. Without loss
of generality, let us assume that legacy two-level paging structure is being used. As
shown in Figure 3.2(a), given a breakpoint address BA = (P GB, GV A), the processor traverses along a path from the page directory to the page table to translate it
to a guest physical address. The only way to change the virtual-to-physical mapping at BA is to modify the paging-structure entries that is traversed during address
translation, which is shown as the rectangle area in the page directory and the page
table. To capture such modifications, Spider sets these paging structures to readonly (shown as grey) in the EPT. When there is a write access to a paging structure,
an EPT violation will be triggered and captured by Spider. Spider will record the
current values of paging-structure entries, then temporarily set the paging structure
to writable and let the guest single-step through the instruction that performs the
write access. After the single-stepping, Spider will read the new values of pagingstructure entries and see which ones of them have been modified. After that, Spider
will set the paging structure back to read-only to capture future modifications. The
action that Spider performs to handle the modification depends on the type of the
paging-structure entries that get modified:
Bottom-level paging-structure entries. As shown in Figure 3.2(b), when the
bottom-level paging-structure entry used to translate BA is modified, the mapping
changes from BA ! GP A1 to BA ! GP A2 . As a result, Spider first removes the
invisible breakpoint at GP A1 . Then Spider compares the content of the page that
contains GP A1 and the page that contains GP A2 . If they are exactly the same (which
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is the case we show in the figure), then it is safe to move the breakpoint to GP A2 .
Otherwise, as the code in the page has changed, it is handled in the same way as a
breakpoint that might no longer be valid due to code modification (Section 3.4.4).
It is worth noting that the figure only shows the scenario where the mapping
changes from a present one to another present one. The mapping might also changes
from not-present to present, or oppositely. If the mapping changes from BA ! N IL
to BA ! GP A, or from BA ! GP A to BA ! N IL, Spider will create/remove
invisible breakpoint at GP A, respectively.
Non-bottom-level paging-structure entries. Figure 3.2(c) shows the scenario
when a non-bottom-level paging-structure entry used to translate BA is modified.
The virtual-to-physical mapping changes from BA ! GP A1 to BA ! GP A3 , so
Spider moves the breakpoint from GP A1 to GP A3 . In addition to that, the path
which the processor traverses along to perform address translation is also modified,
so Spider also removes the read-only attribute from the paging structures in the
previous path (Page Table 1) and sets the paging structures in the new path (Page
Table 2) to read-only. For simplicity, we only show the change of one mapping and
one path in Figure 3.2(c). In practice, modification of a non-bottom-level pagingstructure entry may a↵ect multiple paths and mappings, each of which will be handled
by Spider individually.
There is a special case that the path used for address translation is incomplete
because a non-bottom-level paging-structure entry is set to non-present, as shown
in Figure 3.2(d). This could happen when setting a breakpoint at a virtual address
that is not mapped in the guest, or after a non-bottom-level paging-structure entry is
modified. Spider sets the paging structures along the path to read-only, including the
one that has the non-present entry. Later, when the paging-structure entry changes
from non-present to present, the path will extend, and Spider will set the paging
structures on the extended path to read-only. After the path reaches the bottom-level
paging-structure (e.g. as in Figure 3.2(a)), Spider could handle further modifications
using standard approaches as mentioned above.
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3.4.4 Handling Code Modification
When the guest tries to modify the content of a split page, the write operation
will be performed on its data view. This means that if an instruction is modified, the
change will not be reflected in the code view. This could lead to incorrect execution
of self-modifying programs, and could be utilized by malware to detect the existence
of Spider. To guarantee transparency, Spider must synchronize any change of the
data view to the code view.
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, Spider sets the data view of a split page to readonly in EPT to intercept any writing attempt. When the guest tries to write to the
page, an EPT violation will be triggered and captured. Spider records the o↵set of
the data OF F that is going to be written in the page. Spider also records the length
LEN that will be synchronized by matching the instruction’s op-code in a pre-built
table which stores the maximum data length that could be a↵ected by each type of
instruction. Then Spider will temporarily set the data view to writable, and let the
guest single-step through the instruction that performs the write. After that, it will
copy LEN bytes from o↵set OF F in the data view to the same o↵set in the code
view.
It is worth noting that the breakpoints that have been set in the page may or
may not be valid after code modification. For example, if the guest overwrites an
instruction with the same instruction, it indicates the guest is trying to overwrite and
disable the breakpoint set at that instruction; in that case, the breakpoint is still valid
and should be re-set when overwritten. But if the guest overwrites the instruction
with a di↵erent instruction, re-setting breakpoint at the original place blindly may
not make sense. Hence, we allow the user to specify a function which will be invoked
when the page that contains the breakpoint is being modified, in which the user could
perform proper actions to handle the event, such as re-setting the breakpoint at the
same place, or moving it to another location after analyzing the modified code.
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3.4.5 Data Watchpoint
Spider allows setting a data watchpoint at a specific physical address by adjusting
the EPT entry of the guest physical page that contains the memory address to readonly (to trap write access) or execute-only (to trap both read/write access). When the
page is accessed, an EPT violation will be triggered and captured by Spider. Spider
will check if a watchpoint has been set on the address that is accessed in the page;
if so, it will call the corresponding user-provided watchpoint handler. After that, it
will temporarily set the EPT entry to writable and resume the guest to single-step
through the instruction that does the memory access. When the guest returns from
single-stepping, Spider adjusts the EPT entry again to trap future accesses. Like
invisible breakpoint, data watchpoint also utilizes the virtual-to-physical mapping
monitoring method (Section 3.4.3) so that it could be used to trap memory access at
any virtual address.

3.4.6 Handling Timing Side-E↵ect
In hardware virtualization, since part of the CPU time is taken by hypervisor and
VMEntry/VMExit, a program costs more time to run than in a native environment.
Attackers could execute the RDTSC instruction to read the Time Stamp Counter
(TSC) which stores the elapsed CPU cycles to detect the discrepancy. To maintain
transparency, Spider needs to hide the CPU cycles cost by hypervisor (Th ) and
VMEntry/VMExit (Te ) from the guest. Spider measures Th by reading the TSC
right after each VMExit and right before each VMEntry and calculating the di↵erence.
Te is approximated by profiling a loop of RDTSC instruction in guest. Spider sets
the TSC-o↵set field in virtual machine control structure (VMCS) to
the value is subtracted from the TSC seen by the guest [78].

(Th + Te ) so
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3.5 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of Spider on the KVM 3.5 hypervisor. The
prototype implements the design as described in Section 4.4 in the kernel module
part of KVM (kvm-kmod) to provide the primitive of setting invisible breakpoint at
specified virtual address in a process address space. Based on the primitive, it also
implements a front-end for Spider in the userspace part of KVM (qemu-kvm) to
provide features that make debugging and instrumentation more convenient. It is
worth noting that Spider itself is OS-independent; However, the front-end requires
knowledge of the guest OS to perform VMI [79] for some features. Currently, our
front-end supports both Windows XP SP2 32-bit and Ubuntu Linux 12.04 32-bit
guest. We now discuss the implementation of some features in our front-end.
Kernel Breakpoints. We have to specify an address space when setting an invisible
breakpoint. For kernel breakpoints, we could specify the address space of any process
as the kernel space is mapped in the same way for any process. We hence choose the
address space of a long-lasting process (init in Linux and System in Windows), so
the breakpoint will not be cleared due to process termination.
Monitor Process Creation. In practice, in addition to debugging running programs, it is also desirable to have the ability to get the control of a program at the
moment when it is just created. For example, when analyzing malware, users often
need to trap the execution at its entry point; if the malware is already running, it
would be too late to set the breakpoint. To support such requirement, our front-end
monitors process creation events. We set invisible breakpoints at related kernel functions to capture a newly created process and match its name against the one specified
by the user. The user could get notified as soon as a process of the target program
is created, and perform corresponding actions such as setting an invisible breakpoint
at the entry point.
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In Windows, a process is created through the NtCreateProcessEx 1 system call,
which calls the PspCreateProcess kernel function to do the actual work. We set a
breakpoint at the instruction right after the call to PspCreateProcess. When the
breakpoint is triggered, we walk through the active process list at PsActiveProcessHead to find out the EPROCESS of the newly created process. The name is
stored in its ImageFileName field.
In Linux, there are two system calls fork and clone that could be used to create
a new process. They both call the same function copy process to do the actual work,
so we set a breakpoint at the instruction right after the call. When the breakpoint
is triggered, the task struct of the newly created task is in the EAX register as the
return value. As clone could also be called to create thread, we need to verify the
newly created task is a process by making sure its address space identifier (stored
in task struct.mm-¿pgd ) is di↵erent from the one of the current task. The name is
stored in the task struct.comm field.
Monitor Process Termination. When a process terminates, all invisible breakpoints in its address space should be cleared. Our front-end sets invisible breakpoints
at related kernel functions to monitor process termination. When a terminating process is captured, we use its address space identifier to check if it is one of our debuggee
targets. If so, we will clear all invisible breakpoints in this target and remove the target.
In Windows, we set the breakpoint at the entry of the function PspProcessDelete,
which handles cleanup when a process terminates. When the breakpoint is triggered,
we read the first argument of the function from the stack, which is the EPROCESS
structure of the process. The address space identifier is in its Pcb.DirectoryTableBase
field.
In Linux, we set the breakpoint at the entry of the function do exit, which handles
the termination of the current task. However, the task could be a process or thread.
We determine if the task is a process by checking if the task struct.pid field matches
1

Another system call NtCreateProcess for process creation is a wrapper of NtCreateProcessEx.
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the task struct.tgid field. The address space identifier is read from the task struct.mm¿pgd field.
The system call execve in Linux requires special handling. Although it does not
create a new process or terminate an existing process, it changes the program running
in the current task. We consider that both process “termination” and “creation” are
involved in this procedure: the current task which runs the previous program is
“terminated”, and one that loads the new program is “created”. As execve calls
do execve to do the actual work, we set a breakpoint right before the function call to
capture the “terminated” current task, and another breakpoint right after the call to
capture the “created” one.
Table 3.1.: Transparency of Spider and other debuggers/DBI frameworks.
Target

Spider OllyDbg 1.10
IDA Pro 6.1
DynamoRIO 4.0.1-1
Software Protectors (Applied to hostname.exe)
Safengine Shielden 2.1.9.0
Pass
Fail
Fail
Fail
Themida 2.1.2.0
Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
PECompact 3.02.1 (w/ead loader) Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
ASProtect 1.5
Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
RLPack 1.21
Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
Armadillo 9.60
Pass
Fail
Fail
Fail
tElock 0.98
Pass
Fail
Fail HBP/SBP Fail
Anti-debugging & Anti-instrumentation POC Samples
eXait
Pass
Pass
Pass
Fail
hardware bp.exe
Pass
Fail HBP
Fail
Pass
heapflags.exe
Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
instruction counting.exe
Pass
Fail HBP
Fail HBP
Fail
ntglobal.exe
Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
peb.exe
Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
rdtsc.exe
Pass
Fail HBP/SBP Fail HBP/SBP Pass
software bp.exe
Pass
Fail SBP
Fail SBP
Pass

PIN 2.12
Fail
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
Pass
Fail
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass

3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of Spider. The experiments are done on
a Thinkpad T510 laptop with Intel Core i7-3720QM 2.6GHz CPU and 8GB RAM.
The host OS is Ubuntu Linux 12.10 64-bit. We use Windows XP SP2 32-bit and
Ubuntu Linux 12.04 32-bit as the guest OS. We allocate 30GB image file as the hard
disk and 1GB memory for the guest VM.
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3.6.1 Transparency
To evaluate the transparency of Spider, we use two groups of Windows programs with anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation techniques. For comparison, we
use Spider, two debuggers (OllyDbg and IDA Pro) and two DBI frameworks (DynamoRIO and PIN) to trap the execution of the target programs at certain locations.
In Spider, the trapping is done by setting invisible breakpoints. In the debuggers, we
use software or hardware breakpoints. The DBI frameworks insert instrumentations
at desired instructions for trapping.
The first group of targets consists of 7 software protectors, which are widely used
by both COTS software vendors and malware authors to protect their programs from
being analyzed or modified. We apply these software protectors to a system program
hostname.exe in Window XP SP2. This program reads and displays the host name
of the local system; our goal is to trap the execution of its protected versions to get
the host name string. We reverse-engineer the original program and find out the
address of the host name string is store in the eax register when the program runs
to the address 0x10011C6. This also holds in the protected versions, as this program
does not contain relocation information and could not be relocated by the protectors.
Hence, we set the traps at 0x10011C6 in the protected versions. However, for some of
the protectors, we could not set the trap when the program starts, as the instruction
at 0x10011C6 is encrypted by the protectors and has not been decrypted at that
time. We hence set a data watchpoint at 0x10011C6 to monitor the decryption, and
set the trap once the instruction is decrypted.
We turn on all anti-debugging, anti-instrumentation and anti-VM options of the
protectors when using them. The only exception is when we use Safengine Shielden,
we turn o↵ its anti-VM option. With that option on, we found that the program
protected by Safengine Shielden would cease to function even when we run it in
vanilla KVM without Spider; but it runs correctly in BitVisor, which is another
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hardware virtualization based hypervisor. We hence conclude that the problem is
due to the implementation of KVM but not Spider.
The second group of targets includes 8 proof-of-concept (POC) samples. Among
these programs, eXait [69] aims at detecting DBI frameworks. We randomly select
10 instructions in it for trapping. The rest 7 samples implement the anti-debugging
techniques commonly used in malware that is not protected by protectors, according
to the statistics in [80]. Since these samples are very small (tens of instructions), we
choose to trap every instruction in them.
The result is shown in Table 3.1. “Pass” indicates the program runs properly
and its execution is successfully trapped at the desired location. “Fail” means the
program fails to run properly in the environment even without any trap. “Fail HBP”
and “Fail SBP” means the program fails to run properly after setting hardware breakpoint or software breakpoint. We can see that OllyDbg and IDA Pro fail at every
target except eXait; most targets could detect their existence even when no trap is
set. DynamoRIO and PIN perform better, but are still detected by 5 and 4 targets, respectively. Compared with them, Spider successfully maintains transparency
against all 15 targets; there are 3 targets that could only be transparently trapped
by Spider.
We also test Spider against techniques of detecting emulators in [71–73], which
we implement as individual POC programs. We run them in Spider and trap every
instruction in these programs as they are very short. As we expected, none of them
is able to detect Spider, as Spider is built upon hardware virtualization.

3.6.2 Case Study I: Attack Provenance
In this case study, we demonstrate the use of Spider to improve the tamperresistance of an existing attack provenance system BEEP [11]. Traditional attack
provenance approaches are based on analysis of system event log with per-process
granularity (i.e., each log entry pertains to one process). Such approaches face the
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problem of dependency explosion when a long running process receives/produces a
lot of inputs/outputs during its lifetime as each output is considered causally related
to all preceding inputs. To solve this problem, BEEP partitions the execution of a
program into individual units, with each unit handling an independent input request
(e.g., one email or one web request) in one event-handling loop iteration. With such
a finer logging granularity, BEEP is able to link each output to the truly related
input(s) hence achieving higher attack provenance accuracy.
To capture the entry and exit of each unit, BEEP needs to instrument the target binary program at certain locations. BEEP uses a static binary rewriting tool
PEBIL [8] to perform such instrumentation, which has several shortcomings: (1) Attackers could patch the instrumented program at runtime to disable BEEP; (2) The
instrumentation needs to modify the code in the program, hence cannot be applied
to programs with self-checking and self-protection mechanisms, which widely exist in
COTS software to prevent malicious software manipulation. To overcome these problems, we use Spider to replace PEBIL for BEEP’s instrumentation. The reliability of
Spider (Section 3.3) guarantees that the instrumentation could not be circumvented
or disabled. More importantly, Spider performs instrumentation by setting invisible
breakpoints, which are transparent to the target applications.
We evaluate the e↵ectiveness and performance of our approach using 7 Linux2
binary programs. We first identify the instrumentation points for each program using
BEEP. We then set Spider to monitor the creation of processes of these programs.
Once a process of a target program is created, we set invisible breakpoints at the
instrumentation points in its address space. The original instrumentation routines
in BEEP invoke a special system call to log unit-specific events; we modify them to
directly log unit events into a file in the host.
We repeated the case studies in [11] and verified the correctness of attack provenance achieved by our system. We also measure the overhead of our system over the
execution of the programs in vanilla KVM. In vanilla KVM we enable Linux audit
2

The prototype of BEEP only supports Linux currently.

63

6.000%
5.000%

Overhead

4.000%

3.000%
2.000%
1.000%
0.000%

wget

yafc

proftpd cherokee

vim

apache

firefox

Figure 3.3.: Overhead of using Spider to perform instrumentation for BEEP.

system but do not perform instrumentation. For wget and yafc, we run them to
download a 1.2MB file from a server 500 times. For apache and cherokee, we use the
weighttp to generate 1 million requests with 100 threads and 100 concurrency. For
proftpd, we use the integration test provided with it. We use the SunSpider benchmark for firefox. For vim, we feed it a script to replace the first character of each
line with ‘a’ in 50000 text files. All network programs except firefox are evaluated
in a dedicated LAN to rule out the factor of network delay. The result is shown in
Figure 3.3. The overhead is less than 2% except firefox and vim. The overhead for
firefox is slightly higher because it has more instrumentation points (24) than other
programs (2⇠6), which leads to more breakpoint hits. The overhead for vim is due
to an instrumentation point which gets triggered each time the script processes a
line. Users will experience much less overhead when they use vim interactively as the
instrumentation point is triggered much less frequently.
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3.6.3 Case Study II: Stealthy Introspection
We now demonstrate the use of Spider to reveal a possible threat to two popular Windows instant messaging programs, anonymized as IM1 and IM2 .

The

threat involves the acquisition of confidential application data without user awareness. Such data usually have very short lifetime in memory and are encrypted before network transmission. Hence they are deemed difficult/impossible to acquire
through memory scanning or network sniffing. We also protect the two applications
using the (arguably) strongest protector Safengine Shielden, so that existing debugging/instrumentation techniques cannot be used to analyze them. Now, we show that
even with those protections, confidential data could still be “stolen” by using Spider
to trap the program at the right instruction. The stealthiness and efficiency of Spider make it possible to perform the attack while the programs are running normally;
none of the existing techniques could achieve the same level of user-transparency and
efficiency. The realism of the threat is backed by the fact that, an attacker is able
to transparently hijack a running OS into a VM on malicious hypervisor (e.g., using
BluePill [81]). Once that happens, Spider can be used to stealthily set invisible
breakpoints on the target application for confidential data acquisition by the hypervisor. In the following description, such breakpoints are set on the functions and
memory locations in bold font.
IM1 . We show the possibility of capturing all communication between a sender
and the user. To find the function that handles messages, we search through the
functions exported by the libraries of IM1 . We find a function named SaveMsg3
in KernelUtil.dll and set an invisible breakpoint at the entry of that function. As
expected, the function is called every time a message is received; we also find out one
of its parameters is the ID of the sender. However, the message text is not directly
present in the argument list, which implies that it might be part of a data structure
rooted at one of the arguments. We further speculate that a message may need to
3

Note that the binary of IM1 does not contain symbolic information. We simply inspect the export
table.
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be decoded either inside SaveMsg or through some other related function. We find
a function named GetMsgAbstract in the list of exported functions. The name
suggests that it may need to decode a message. We set a breakpoint at its entry and
another one at its return. We observe that the message text is in fact decoded as its
return value. We also find out that at the entry of GetMsgAbstract that the value
of one of its parameters is always the same as one of the parameters of SaveMsg,
which might both point to the same opaque structure that contains the message text.
Therefore, we log all messages at GetMsgAbstract return and associate them to
individual senders by matching the parameters of GetMsgAbstract and SaveMsg.
As such, we are able to identify all messages from individual senders.
IM2 . We show the possibility of capturing user login credentials in IM2 . We first find
the functions that read the username and password. As a native Win32 application,
we suspect it uses the GetWindowTextW Windows API function to retrieve the
text from the controls in the login dialog. We set a breakpoint at the entry of
that function and log all its invocations. After we rule out unrelated invocations by
checking if the retrieved text matches a login credential, we find out the invocations
at 0x449dbd and 0x437a23 are for retrieving username and password, respectively.
The remaining problem is to find out if the captured login credential is valid. As
an error message will be displayed upon failed login, we set a breakpoint at the
MessageBoxW function. From the call stack we could read the functions on the
path of failed login. We set breakpoints on these functions too. We then do a
successful login to see if it shares the same path. We find that both successful and
failed logins will execute to the function at 0x48591c, and then the path deviates.
Successful login will execute to the branch of 0x485bcd, while failed login leads
to another branch. Therefore, we log the content acquired by GetWindowTextW
when it is invoked at 0x449dbd and 0x437a23, and then we use the call stack path
to prune those belonging to failed logins.
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We verified that the confidential data (messages or login credentials) is correctly
and completely acquired through stealthy introspection, without any slow-down of
program execution.

3.6.4 Performance Overhead
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Figure 3.4.: Relation between the overhead of Spider and the number of
breakpoint hits.

We have already presented the empirical overhead of Spider in our case studies
in Section 3.6.2. In this experiment, we further study the overhead of Spider. We
build a micro benchmark program that executes a loop for a given number of times.
In each loop iteration, the program increments a variable 1000 times. The program
executes the RDTSC instruction to read the CPU cycle counter before and after the
loop, and calculate the di↵erence which is the number of CPU cycles cost by the loop.
We compile the program with Visual Studio 2010 in Windows.
We run the program using the parameter from 104 to 106 iterations, with a step
of 104 . The program is executed in both vanilla KVM and Spider; In Spider, we
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set an invisible breakpoint at the first instruction of the loop. We obtain the number
of CPU cycles cost by the loop in vanilla KVM and Spider, and the di↵erence is
the overhead, as shown in Figure 3.4. From the figure, we could see that the overhead is linear to the number of breakpoint hits. A single invisible breakpoint hit
costs around 3217 CPU cycles. A large part of the overhead is due to the transitions
between host and guest during breakpoint handling. A round-trip transition costs
about 1200 cycles (measured using kvm-unit-test). This is the cost we have to pay
to maximize stealthiness: To prevent any in-guest side e↵ect, the breakpoint handler
must run outside the guest VM, which means the transition is inevitable. Nevertheless, the overhead of our invisible breakpoint is still less than the breakpoint in an
existing work [15] and comparable with in-guest hardware breakpoint. Considering
that the cost of VMExit/VMEntry is decreasing over the years [82], the overhead of
our approach is likely to be less in future processors.
We also measure the overhead of other components in Spider, including the
cost of splitting code and data views and monitoring the guest virtual-to-physical
mapping. We exclude the overhead of breakpoint hits by setting “fake” breakpoints,
which use the original instruction as the breakpoint instruction instead of int3. The
target program we use is gzip 1.2.4. We run the program in both vanilla KVM and
Spider to compress a 98.7MB file and measure the execution time. In Spider, we
set a breakpoint at one instruction in each page of the code section to make sure
all code pages are split. The run in vanilla KVM costs 4171ms, while the run in
Spider costs 4192ms. The overhead is less than 1% which confirms that the number
of breakpoint hits is the dominant factor of overhead.

3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we present Spider, a stealthy binary program instrumentation
and debugging framework. Spider uses invisible breakpoint, a novel primitive to trap
execution of program at any desired instruction efficiently. Our evaluation shows
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Spider is transparent against various anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation techniques. We have applied Spider in two security application scenarios, demonstrating
its transparency, efficiency and flexibility.
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4 IRIS: VETTING PRIVATE API ABUSE IN IOS APPLICATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Mobile devices, especially tablets and smartphones have gained tremendous popularity in recent years. Apple iOS is one of the dominating mobile platforms on the
market; by the end of January 2015, Apple has sold one billion iOS devices [83]. One
of its major success factors is the large number of third-party iOS applications that
provide a wide variety of functionalities to users. To rapidly grow the iOS ecosystem,
Apple creates the App Store which allows third-party developers to distribute their
own iOS applications. As of September 2014, there are 1.3 million iOS applications
available in the App Store [84].
Allowing third-party applications to run on iOS devices greatly improves the user
experience. However, it also opens up the opportunity for malicious developers to
attack the system and users. To prevent third-party applications from performing
malicious activities, iOS employs a bunch of runtime protection mechanisms such as
Sandboxing, Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR).
Unfortunately, even under these runtime protections, attack is still feasible through
the use of private APIs. Private APIs are functions in iOS frameworks reserved only
for internal uses in built-in applications. They provide accesses to various device resources (e.g. camera, bluetooth) and sensitive information (e.g. serial number, device
ID), which are often not regulated by runtime mechanism. Although some resources
are guarded by entitlements with MAC in recent version of iOS, there are still many
that can be accessed without mediation.
As a countermeasure to the attack, Apple strictly prohibits any use of private APIs
in third-party applications, according to its iOS developer license agreement [85]. To
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enforce the policy, every third-party application submitted to App Store has to go
through Apple’s vetting process called App Review before it can be distributed to end
users. Applications that pass App Review are digitally signed by Apple to prevent
further modification. The signature is verified by iOS at runtime to ensure that only
the original applications approved by App Review can run on iOS devices.
App Review has significantly raised the difficulty of distributing malicious applications to end users. Given the fact that very few malicious applications have been
found on iOS [86], it is generally believed that App Review is quite e↵ective. However, recent work [39, 40] shows that by constructing the names of private APIs at
runtime, it is possible to invoke private APIs in third-party applications and still be
able to pass the vetting process. While Apple has never publicly disclosed the technical details of App Review, these attacks clearly indicate the current vetting process
is based on static analysis which is vulnerable to obfuscation. Although Apple complements automatic analysis with manual inspection [87], due to the large number of
application submissions, it could only cover a small portion of all applications.
Besides Apple’s App Review, there are several automated binary analysis systems [38, 88–90] proposed by security researchers to analyze iOS applications. However, these approaches also have shortcomings. System based on static analysis [38]
could not resolve API names composed at runtime. Dynamic approaches [88–90]
su↵er from incomplete code coverage, thus would fail to detect uses of private APIs
if malicious application authors place the invocations behind complicated triggering
conditions.
To overcome the limitations of existing application vetting approaches on iOS, we
present iRiS, an automated system that can e↵ectively detect uses of private APIs
in iOS applications. Given a binary iOS application, iRiS uses a combination of
static and dynamic analysis to resolve the names of the functions being called in
the program. iRiS first statically scans all function call sites and tries to resolve the
names of the call targets using constant propagation and backward slicing. For the
remaining call sites whose targets could not be statically determined, iRiS utilizes
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dynamic binary instrumentation to drive the execution of the application to the call
sites to resolve the call targets at runtime.
We have encountered and solved many challenges of performing binary analysis on
iOS in the design of iRiS. Due to the closed-source nature of iOS, there is no existing
dynamic binary instrumentation framework available on it. As part of our e↵ort, we
have ported Valgrind [18] to iOS and built the dynamic analysis component of iRiS
on top of it. Also, most iOS applications are based on event-driven graphical user
interface (GUI) which exhibits very limited behavior without human interactions.
In iRiS, we propose an automated UI event handler exploration approach by using
dynamic binary instrumentation to monitor the registration of event handlers and
trigger them automatically.
We have used iRiS to analyze 2019 free applications on the App Store. To our
surprise, the result shows that more than one hundred of these applications use private
APIs. In some applications, we even identified the behavior of using private APIs to
retrieve personal information (e.g. the applications installed on the device, the serial
number of the device and its various components such as cameras and battery) and
sending such information to advertisement providers. This clearly shows that the
current application vetting approach used by Apple is insufficient to guarantee the
security and privacy of iOS device users.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We have ported the popular instrumentation framework Valgrind [18] to iOS.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instruction-level dynamic binary
instrumentation framework on iOS.
• We present the design and the prototype implementation of iRiS, an automated
system using a combination of static and dynamic analysis to detect uses of
private API in binary iOS applications.
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• To show the e↵ectiveness of our approach, we have analyzed more than 2000 iOS
applications. Our result shows that a non-trivial number of iOS applications
use security-critical private APIs to access and steal sensitive user information.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce the
background. We demonstrate the practical challenges and our solutions for porting
Valgrind to iOS in Section 4.3. Then we present our approach of resolving API call
targets in Section 4.4. We discuss the limitations of iRiS in Section 4.6 and compare
with related work in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 summarizes this chapter.

4.2 iOS Background
In this section, we introduce background about various aspects of iOS. This would
help the readers to better understand our system described in later sections.

(1) C Function Call:
CGRectMake(0, 0, 100, 100);
(2) Objective-C Method Call:
[myView drawNumber:1];
objc_msgSend(myView,
“drawNumber”, 1);
(3) Superclass Method Call:
[super didMoveToWindow];
struct objc_super super;
super.id = self;
super.class = UIView;
objc_msgSendSuper(&super,
“didMoveToWindow”);

myView Object
isa
...
...

Class Metadata
super
MyView
methods

...
drawNumber
...

Superclass Metadata
super
...
UIView
didMoveToWindow
methods
...

Figure 4.1.: Di↵erent forms of function invocations in iOS application.

4.2.1 Function Invocations
Objective-C is the major programming language used for building iOS applications. As an extension of the C programming language, Objective-C adds object-
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oriented features such as object, class and inheritance. In Objective-C, function
invocations can take several di↵erent forms as shown in Figure 4.1. Since ObjectiveC is a superset of C, traditional C function can be invoked as shown in case 1. In
addition to that, Objective-C also supports object-oriented method calls as shown in
cases 2 and 3.
The code in the boxes in cases 2 and 3 shows how Objective-C method calls are
actually implemented by sending message to object through one of the objc msgSend
family dynamic dispatch functions. More specifically, a message is composed of a
selector which is the literal name of the method to be invoked, and the arguments to
be passed to the method. In case(2), the drawNumber message is sent to the myView
object. As shown in the path along the arrows, the objc msgSend dispatch function
locates the metadata of the object’s class MyView, finds the implementation (i.e. entry
address) of the drawNumber method and then call it. Similar to other programming
languages that support inheritance, if the corresponding method is not implemented
in the object’s class, the dynamic dispatch function searches through the object’s
superclasses along the class hierarchy.
Case 3 shows the use of super keyword to explicitly call the method in object’s superclass. An objc super structure containing the myView object and the name of its
superclass UIView is constructed and passed to the objc msgSendSuper dispatch function. The dispatch function follows the dashed path to locate the didMoveToWindow
method in UIView and call it.
The dynamic features of Objective-C grant iOS developers a lot of flexibility
in building their applications. Since selectors are just literal method names which
contain no low-level information such as address, developers could easily construct
selectors at runtime to send arbitrary messages to any object. Also, the mapping
between selectors and method implementations could be modified at runtime. Such
cases pose great challenges to binary analysis of iOS applications.
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4.2.2 Private API
iOS provides a rich set of frameworks for building user-level applications. These
frameworks are essentially directories that contain dynamic shared libraries and resources. The dynamic shared libraries expose APIs for applications in two forms: (1)
as traditional C functions that are explicitly exported by the shared libraries; (2) as
methods in Objective-C classes that are managed and dispatched by the Objective-C
runtime.
Among all the frameworks, only some of them are public frameworks that are for
uses in third-party iOS applications. The other ones, known as private frameworks,
are reserved for uses in built-in applications and public frameworks only. Similar
to frameworks, APIs are also categorized into public and private ones depending on
whether they can be used in third-party applications. Note that public frameworks
may also contain private APIs as part of their internal implementation.
Private frameworks and APIs provide many powerful functionalities that could
threaten the security of the system if they are available to third-party applications.
For example, the SpringBoardServices framework provides APIs to launch and
terminate applications; the IOKit framework provides APIs to access mach I/O ports
which could be used to obtain various device information. To prevent third-party
developers from using private APIs, only public frameworks and APIs are documented
and exposed by the header files in iOS software development kit (SDK). However,
despite Apple’s e↵ort of concealing the prototypes of private APIs, they can still be
reverse-engineered from the dynamic shared libraries in the frameworks [91].
Once their prototypes are known, calling private API functions follows the same
procedure as calling public API functions. As a countermeasure, Apple requires
every application submitted to the App Store to go through App Review to make
sure the application binary is only linked to public frameworks and imports only
public C APIs. Invocations of private Objective-C APIs are also detected because
the

objc selrefs section in the application binary contains all statically-known
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message selectors. However, such detection is not always e↵ective. To evade the
detection, the attacker can use the dlopen function to load private frameworks and
the dlsym function to locate and call private C API functions. For private ObjectiveC APIs, the attacker can construct the message selectors at runtime so they do not
appear in the application binary.

4.2.3 iOS Runtime Security
Similar to other modern operating systems, iOS incorporates standard runtime
protections such as DEP and ASLR. In addition to that, it also implements several
enhanced security mechanisms as described below.
Entitlements. iOS provides fine-grained access control based on the TrustedBSD
MAC framework [92]. Each application can declare a set of entitlements that grant
specific capabilities or security permissions in iOS. The iOS kernel checks for corresponding entitlements whenever an application is trying to access guarded resources.
Most entitlements in iOS are for built-in applications; the only ones available to
third-party applications are for enabling iCloud service and pushing notifications. To
prevent third-party developers from abusing or counterfeiting entitlements, entitlements declared in third-party applications are checked for validity during App Review
and then built in to the code signatures of the application binaries. Entitlements effectively regulate the use of private APIs: without proper entitlements, even if the
attacker is able to invoke the private API, iOS will refuse the attempt to access the
resource. Unfortunately, there are still many resources that are not protected by
entitlements in iOS.
Prohibiting dynamic code generation. iOS disallows any kind of dynamic code
generation, except for applications with the dynamic-codesigning entitlement. This
entitlement is for the built-in MobileSafari application to implement JIT Javascript
engine and is unavailable to third-party applications. The prohibition of dynamic
code generation in third-party applications has both positive and negative impact
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on our system: it helps us to better disassemble third-party application binary for
static analysis because there is no dynamically generated or self-modifying code; on
the other hand, it also disables dynamic binary instrumentation frameworks such as
Valgrind due to their needs of translating binary code at runtime. Fortunately, we can
still port Valgrind to jailbroken iOS devices, where the kernel is patched to remove
restrictions on dynamic code generation. Note this does not indicate the applications
we analyze are also free to generate code at runtime; we still prohibit dynamic code
generation in these applications by wrapping and checking the related system calls
(e.g. mprotect) using Valgrind.

User Interface

ViewController Object
UITableView *table

UITableView

UIButton

Delegate

UITableViewDelegate Protocol
-(void)tableView:didSelectRowAtIndexPath:

DataSource

UITableViewDatasource Protocol
-(NSInteger)numberOfSectionsInTableView
UIButton *button

Target-Action

-(void)onButtonClick:

Figure 4.2.: Event driven execution of iOS application.

4.2.4 Execution of iOS Application
We use an example in Figure 4.2 to demonstrate the execution of a typical iOS
application. When the application is launched, it initializes a view controller object
to create and manage views. In our example, the view controller object creates a
UITableView object and a UIButton object to interact with the user. To handle user
inputs, it sets delegate and data source for the table view and registers a target-action
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event handler to the button. These are the two design patterns for implementing event
handlers in iOS, which are described as below.
Target-action. The target-action design pattern is used by all control classes (e.g.
UIButton, UITextField) that are derived from the UIControl base class. Developers
call the addTarget:action:forControlEvents: API to register a pair of target and
action for a specific control event on a UIControl object. The action is the name of
the Objective-C method to be invoked upon triggering the event, and the target is
the object that the method is called on. In our example, the application registers the
onButtonClick: action with the view controller object as the target, for the click
event on the button. When the button is clicked, the onButtonClick: method will
be called on the view controller object.
Delegates and data sources. Delegates are objects that can be assigned to a
view to provide application-specific event handling logic. When an event occurs, the
view sends an Objective-C message to its delegate to invoke the corresponding event
handler. Usually, a delegate must conform to the protocol corresponding to the view
it is assigned to, so that the view knows the required methods are indeed implemented
in the delegate.
In our example, the view controller object itself is assigned to the table view as
a delegate to handle events such as selecting a row in the table. When a row in
the table is selected, the tableView:didSelectRowAtIndexPath: method will be
invoked on the view controller object. The view controller object conforms to the
UITableViewDelegate protocol which declares the event handlers for table view.
Data sources are similar to delegates except they provide application-specific data
instead of logic to views. In our example, the view controller object is also assigned
to the table view as a data source. When iOS renders the table view, it invokes the
numberOfSectionsInTableView method on the view controller object to determine
how many sections are there in the table.
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Nib Files
Besides creating views directly in the application code, iOS application developers
may also choose to load UI elements stored in Nib (NeXT Interface Builder) files. Nib
files are resource files generated by Apple’s UI design tool called Interface Builder,
which allows developers to design UI views and related non-visual objects (e.g. view
controllers) in a visualized environment. The views and objects are serialized in the
format of object graph and stored in Nib files.
The UIKit framework provides several APIs to load Nib files at runtime. These
Nib-loading APIs are responsible for reconstructing the views, objects and the connections among them to the same state as designed in Interface Builder. It is worth
noting that in each Nib file, there is a special placeholder object called File’s Owner.
The File’s Owner object is provided by the application as an argument to Nib-loading
API, which serves as the link between the application code and the UI elements in
Nib file. It usually contains outlets, which are references to the views and objects in
Nib files. The outlets are connected by the Nib-loading API during the process of
loading Nib Files.
To demonstrate the detail of the loading process, we still use the example in
Figure 4.2, but we assume the views are loaded from a Nib file. We assume the
information of the delegate, data source and the target-action event handler are all
properly stored as connections to the File’s Owner object in the Nib file. We provide the view controller object as the File’s Owner object. According to Apple’s
documentation [93], the loading process consists of the following steps:
1. The Nib-loading API allocates the view objects and send them initWithCoder:
messages to initialize the views. During the initialization of the table view, its
delegate and data source are set to the File’s Owner object, which is the view
controller.
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2. It connects the outlets (table and button variable) in the view controller to
the two views by calling the setValue:forKey: method on the view controller.
The values are the view objects and the keys are the name of the outlets.
3. It registers the onButtonClick: method in the view controller object as a
target-action event handler to the button.
4. It sends an awakeFromNib message to the two views to notify them the loading
is complete.
Clearly, the loading process implicitly involves invocations to many APIs, which all
have to be considered in our analysis.

4.3 Porting Valgrind to iOS
In order to build the dynamic analysis component in iRiS, we ported the popular
dynamic binary instrumentation framework Valgrind to iOS. Valgrind already supports ARM architecture. It also supports OS X, Apple’s desktop operating system
that shares the same kernel as iOS. Therefore, we could reuse the CPU-specific and
OS-specific code. However, we still need to implement the parts that are specific to
the combination of CPU and OS. We also encounter many practical challenges specific to iOS, some of which are discussed below. We plan to open source the ported
framework to support future work on iOS security.
Calling convention of system call. Valgrind needs to interpose system calls to
perform many crucial operations, such as thread and memory management. Unfortunately, the calling convention of system calls in iOS is not publicly documented.
Our idea here is to infer the calling convention from the execution of the system
call wrapper functions. We build a program that calls system call wrapper functions
with carefully crafted arguments. Then we run the program and use GDB to set
a breakpoint at those functions. Once a breakpoint is hit, we do single step until
reaching a SWI instruction, which is used to perform system call on ARM. It is then
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straightforward to infer the calling convention by observing which argument value is
stored in which register or stack memory location at that point.
Reading symbols from dyld shared cache. The symbol table maintained by Valgrind is important for translating addresses to human-readable API names. Normally,
Valgrind reads symbols from shared libraries when they are loaded into the address
space of the application. However, there is no such loading of individual libraries in
iOS. All shared libraries in iOS are combined into a single large file called dyld shared
cache, which is mapped into the application’s address space by the kernel when the
application is loaded. To read the symbols, we invoke the shared region check np
system call to obtain the start address of the shared cache. Since the symbols of all
libraries are too large to fit in the memory available to Valgrind, we read the symbols
of a specific library from the shared cache only when its code is executed the first
time.
Instrumenting GUI applications. In iOS, GUI applications has to be launched
by sending a launch request with the bundle id of the application to SpringBoard.
Clearly, Valgrind has to be launched this way when instrumenting GUI applications.
However, the applications launched by SpringBoard run on behalf of the user mobile,
which does not have the root privilege required by Valgrind. We solve this problem by
setting the owner of the Valgrind executable to root and setting its setuid attribute.

4.4 Resolving API Call Targets
4.4.1 Overview
The goal of iRiS is to identify the targets of all API calls in iOS application
binaries. This cannot be done with pure static analysis due to the dynamic features of
Objective-C. Theoretically, dynamic analysis could resolve all the targets by utilizing
approaches such as symbolic execution [94] or forced execution [95] to explore every
path leading to API call. However, such approaches are infeasible in practice due
to the large size of iOS applications. For example, the Facebook iOS application
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Figure 4.3.: Overview of iRiS.

binary has the size of 48MB, containing about 10 million instructions and 1.4 million
branches. Binaries of such scale could not be handled by symbolic execution. Even
forced execution with complexity linear to the number of branches would take several
weeks to explore all the necessary paths in a single application.
To solve this problem, we adopt an approach that combines static and dynamic
analysis in iRiS. Our key observation here is that the vast majority of call targets
in normal iOS application binaries can be resolved using static analysis, which is
fast and scales well with the size of the program. For the very few remaining call
sites whose targets cannot be statically determined, we apply the slower, but more
powerful dynamic analysis to get the targets from the concrete execution states at
the call sites.
An overview of iRiS is shown in Figure 4.3. The input to iRiS is an iOS packaged
application (with an .ipa file extension) downloaded from the App Store, which is
essentially a zip file containing the application executable, resources and other metadata. iRiS first extracts the application executable and the Nib resource files from
the package. Since all applications submitted by third-party developers are encrypted
by Apple before they are distributed through the App Store, iRiS needs to decrypt
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the application executable to the raw binary executable before it can proceed to the
analysis.
The analysis begins with resource analysis of the Nib files. For each Nib file, iRiS
identifies the functions in the application binary that are implicitly invoked when the
Nib file is loaded. In this way, each Nib file is represented as a set of call targets it
implies. In later stages of static and dynamic analysis, upon encountering an API
call that loads a Nib file, iRiS will add the call targets implied by the Nib file to the
API call site.
After analyzing Nib resources, iRiS performs static analysis on the decrypted application binary executable. iRiS disassembles the binary using IDA Pro [13] and
scans for all call sites. Similar to PiOS [38], iRiS tries to use backward slicing and
forward constant propagation to resolve the call targets at each call site to generate an initial call graph. For each function in the binary, iRiS also generates its
intra-procedural control-flow graph (CFG). The initial call graph and intra-procedural
CFGs serve as guidance for the final stage of analysis.
In the final stage, iRiS iteratively resolves the remaining call sites whose targets
could not be statically determined, using dynamic analysis. In each iteration, iRiS
picks a call site with unresolved targets from the call graph, and uses the call graph
and intra-procedural CFGs to explore paths to the call site to obtain the call targets.
The resolved call targets are merged back to the call graph, which helps resolving
more targets in later iterations. After all iterations are finished, the call targets in
the final call graph are checked against iOS SDK headers to reveal uses of private
APIs.

4.4.2 Resource Analysis
Resource analysis aims to identify application functions implicitly invoked in the
process of loading a Nib file. It is infeasible to statically examine a Nib file to obtain
such information since the file format is not publicly known. Our idea here is to load
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the Nib file artificially using the API in the UIKit framework, and use Valgrind to
monitor the function invocations in this process.
However, there are several challenges to load a Nib file artificially. Creating a
dummy program that blindly calls the Nib-loading API would most likely fail, as
a Nib file is not a self-contained entity that can be loaded in arbitrary context.
For example, the objects stored in a Nib file might be of custom classes defined
in the application binary. The Nib-loading API would fail when it tries to invoke the
initialization methods of these objects, as they do not exist in the dummy program.
Also, since the provided File’s Owner object does not contain the outlets expected in
the Nib file, the Nib-loading API will fail when trying to connect the outlets.
To overcome these challenges, we utilize the application itself to provide the proper
context for loading the Nib files. We run the application with DYLD INSERT LIBRARIES
environment variable to inject a preload shared library containing the Nib-loading
code to its address space. In the preload shared library, we invoke the Nib-loading API
in a function with the constructor attribute so it is executed before any other code
(except global initialization routines) in the application binary. To handle outlets, we
provide a fake File’s Owner object to the Nib-loading API which ignores connections
to undefined outlets by overriding the setValue:forUndefinedKey: method, which
is the fail-safe method when the setValue:forKey: method for connecting outlets
fails. We terminate the application by calling exit right after the Nib file is loaded
so no unrelated code is executed.
Event handler registration functions need to be handled specially. Although the
event handlers are not directly called when they are registered during Nib loading,
we include them as implicit call targets so that they could be explored later in the
iterative dynamic analysis stage. Since we have the concrete execution state, we can
query the Objective-C runtime to get the entry addresses of the event handlers (as the
parameters to the registration functions). A target-action event handler is identified
if the method has the action selector implemented in the class of a target object. For
delegate or data source, we enumerate the methods that are implemented in the class
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of the delegate or data source object and include the ones listed in the delegate or
data source protocol.
Another case that requires special handling is the function invocation to connect
outlets. The setValue:forKey: method for connecting outlets internally invokes
the setter methods of the File’s Owner object to set its properties. However, since
we artificially load the Nib file by providing a fake File’s Owner object, the expected
type of the real File’s Owner object is unknown and the entry addresses of the setter
methods could not be determined at this time. Therefore, we record the keys that
are being set here so that the setter methods could be resolved when the class of the
File’s Owner object is known at later stages of analysis.
The final step of resource analysis is to prune the implicit call targets that have
been obtained so far. This is because the Nib-loading API calls other functions in
the UIKit framework or other frameworks. Such invocations might target private
APIs, which is normal for internal interactions between iOS frameworks but would
trigger false alarms if included in our result. We exclude the call targets that are not
functions in the application by checking whether they fall in the range of the code
section in the application binary.

4.4.3 Static Analysis
The goal in the static analysis stage is to build the intra-procedural CFGs and
resolve call targets to construct call graphs. We build our static analysis as a plugin of
the popular IDA Pro disassembler. Generating the intra-procedural CFGs is straightforward as IDA Pro already performs intra-procedural flow analysis for each function.
However, the ability of IDA Pro to resolve call targets is quite limited. For traditional C function calls, IDA Pro can only identify direct call targets represented as
constant relative addresses embedded in the instructions; it does not resolve indirect
call targets that are stored in registers. Moreover, IDA Pro does not resolve function
arguments stored in either register or stack variables. They are especially important
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for analyzing the target of Objective-C method invocations. For example, even if a
call to the objc msgSend message dispatching function is identified, we would not
be able to know the exact Objective-C method being invoked unless we resolve the
message selector and the object class type from the arguments of the function.
To resolve the call targets that cannot be handled by IDA Pro, we build our analysis based on the approach proposed in PiOS [38] which consists of intra-procedural
backward slicing and forward constant propagation. The basic idea is to use backward slicing to recursively identify a slice of instructions that influence the value of
the register or stack variable related to the call target at the call site. Starting from
the beginning of the slice, statically known constant values are propagated forwardly
according to the semantic of the instructions in the slice to compute the target value.
Our static analysis consists of three passes on the application binary. Compared
with the original approach in PiOS, our approach covers more forms of Objective-C
message dispatching and handles implicit invocations which result in a more precise
and complete call graph. The details of each pass are described as below.

Resolving C Function Calls
In the first pass, we identify all traditional C function calls and resolve their call
targets. On ARM architecture, functions calls are made with BL (branch with link)
and BLX (branch with link and exchange) instructions. We enumerate all these instructions in the application binary and check their operands. Constant operands representing direct call targets are already identified by IDA Pro. For register operands
that contain indirect call targets, we try to use backward slicing and forward constant propagation to resolve their values. For those unresolved operands, we mark
the corresponding call targets as unknown. A resolved call target is identified as an
external API if the target address is one of the following two cases: (1) the address
of an API in the imported symbols section or (2) the address of a stub function that
is a trampoline for calling an external API.
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Resolving Objective-C Messages
Calls to Objective-C message dispatching functions (e.g. objc msgSend) are identified in the first pass. In the second pass, we try to resolve the actual Objective-C
methods invoked in those message dispatching function calls.
For the message dispatching functions that invoke methods in the object’s class,
such as objc msgSend, we use backward slicing and forward constant propagation to
resolve the message selector and the object’s class in the function arguments. Similar
to PiOS, to resolve the object’s class, we propagate not only constants, but also type
information along the slice. Once the message selector and the object’s class are
resolved, we find the corresponding method in the class hierarchy obtained from the
application using the class-dump [96] tool.
Other dispatching functions, such as objc msgSendSuper, are used to explicitly
invoke methods in object’s superclass (Section 4.2.1). The name of the superclass
is provided in an objc super structure, which is pointed to by one of the function
arguments. To identify the superclass, we apply two rounds of slicing and constant
propagation: the first one that resolves the argument pointing to the objc super
structure and the second that resolves the superclass name in the structure. In most
cases, the values could be successfully resolved as these functions are mainly inserted
by the compiler to handle the super keyword in Objective-C source code, where the
superclass is known at compile time.
Any Objective-C method that is not successfully resolved here is marked as unknown target to be processed later in iterative dynamic analysis.

Resolving Implicit Invocations
We resolved the targets of explicit C function calls and Objective-C method invocations in the previous two passes. In the final pass, we aim to find and resolve
the targets of implicit function invocations, which are categorized and discussed as
below.
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Grand central dispatch. Grand central dispatch (GCD) is a runtime system to
support concurrent code execution on iOS. It provides APIs (e.g. dispatch async)
for developers to submit functions to dispatch queues for execution. The argument
of a GCD API could be a function pointer or a block object (a wrapper structure
of function pointer). In either case, we apply backward slicing and forward constant
propagation to get the address of the submitted function and add it as a call target.
Objective-C runtime. As we have mentioned in Section 4.2, the implementation
of an Objective-C method can be changed at runtime. Therefore, it is possible for
a malicious application developer to define a placeholder method, and replace its
implementation with a private API function. After that, the developer could invoke
the completely legitimate placeholder method to use the functionality of the private
API. To prevent such attacks, we try to resolve the arguments of all functions in the
Objective-C runtime that are related to retrieving or replacing the implementation
of a method (e.g. class replaceMethod). Although retrieving the implementation
of a private API does not necessarily mean it will be called, we still consider any
such behavior to be a violation due to the complexity of reasoning about method
replacement statically.
Nested message passing. Some Objective-C classes provide methods to send messages, which resembles the functionality of objc msgSend. For example, NSObject,
the root class of all other Objective-C classes, provides the performSelector family
methods which allow an object to send a message indicated by the argument to itself. The message could even be another performSelector which results in nested
message passing. To handle such cases, we resolve the function arguments recursively
until we reach the innermost message, which is added as the actual target.
Event handler registration. Similar to resource analysis, when we identify an
event handler (target-action, delegate or data source) registration, we add the event
handler as a call target so it could be explored later in dynamic analysis.
Nib file loading. When a call to a Nib-loading API is identified, we try to resolve
the name of the loaded Nib file in the function argument. Once we know which
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Nib file is loaded, we add its corresponding implicit call targets obtained in resource
analysis to the call site of the Nib-loading API. We also resolve the class of the File’s
Owner object provided to the Nib-loading API. In resource analysis, we could not
resolve the setter methods of the File’s Owner object that are invoked to connect
outlets, because the class of the File’s Owner object is unknown at that time. With
the concrete class of the File’s Owner object here, those methods could be resolved
now and added as implicit call targets.
The Nib-loading APIs in the UINib class are handled specially as they consist of
two steps to load a Nib file. First the nibWithNibName:bundle: method is called
to cache the Nib file in memory, and the Nib file is loaded at a later time using
the instantiateWithOwner:options: method. Since it’s infeasible to statically
correlate the calls to these two methods, we leave them to be handled in dynamic
analysis.
Algorithm 3 Call Targets Resolving Algorithm
Input:

CS - the set of unresolved call sites in static analysis
CG - the call graph produced by static analysis
CFG - the intra-procedural control-flow graphs produced by static analysis

Output: CG - the updated call graph with edges to newly resolved call targets
1: CSn
{call sites covered in the natural run}
2: CSprev
{{nil} * sizeof(CS)}
3: repeat
4: change
{nil}
5: for i
0 to sizeof(CS) do
6:
CSrel [i]
{Nodes in paths from CSn to CS[i] in CG}
7:
if CSrel [i] \ CSprev [i] 6= ; then
8:
targets
ForceExecute(CSrel [i], CS[i])
9:
change
change [ InsertTargets(CS[i], targets, CG)
10:
CSprev [i]
CSrel [i]
11:
end if
12: end for
13: until change = ;
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4.4.4 Iterative Dynamic Analysis
In the final stage of the analysis, iRiS uses dynamic analysis to resolve the call
targets that cannot be determined in the static analysis stage. In dynamic analysis,
as long as a function call is covered in an execution, it is straightforward to get its
target and arguments from the concrete execution state at the call site. However,
the task of reaching a specific call site in a dynamic execution itself is challenging.
Also, we have to solve the problem of exploring the program paths that can a↵ect
the target and arguments of the function call.
We propose an iterative algorithm to find and explore the paths that could reach
the target function call sites, as shown in Algorithm 3. The exploration is based on the
initial call graph and the control-flow graphs of all functions generated by the static
analysis. Initially (line 1), the application binary is directly executed in Valgrind
without user interaction to record all call sites in the call graph that are covered in
the natural run. These call sites serve as our starting points in the following rounds
of exploration. The algorithm then explores the paths and updates the call graph in
each iteration (line 4 to line 12). It terminates when there is no change to the call
graph after an iteration (line 13).
In each iteration, we process each unresolved call site individually (line 6 to line
11). We first use depth-first search to compute the related call sites along the paths
from the call sites covered in the natural run to the unresolved call site in the call graph
(line 6). These related call sites are the ones that we use to guide the natural execution
to the target unresolved call site. If the set of related call sites is di↵erent from the
one in the previous iteration (line 7), the algorithm will explore paths following the
new guidance to identify potential new targets at the call site (line 8).
The ForceExecute function (line 8) to explore paths is based on the path exploration algorithm in X-Force [95]. X-Force forces control-flow at branches to explore
the basic blocks in a program. In our scenario, the call sites are analogous to the
basic blocks. We denote that there is a transition from a call site A to another call
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site B if the function FB that contains B is one of the call targets at A. The transitions from one call site to another are analogous to the branches at the end of the
basic blocks. We force those transitions to explore paths along related call sites. The
application runs naturally at the start of each execution of the exploration. Once
the execution reaches any related call site, we start to forcing transitions. Unlike
in X-Force, where the exploration is unbounded, we limit the transitions to related
call sites in our exploration, which ensures that each execution eventually reaches the
desired unresolved call site to get its call targets. For the purpose of demonstration,
let us assume the execution currently reaches the call site A, which calls the function
FB . To force a transition from A to a call site B in FB , we force the control-flow
from the entry of FB to B by forcing branch targets in FB . We compute the basic
blocks in the paths from the entry basic block of FB to the basic block containing B
in the control-flow graph of FB , which we denote as safe basic blocks since execution
reaching any other basic block will not be able to reach B. In the execution starting
from the entry of FB , at each branch, we force the branch target if it does not fall in
the set of the safe basic blocks. In this way, we guarantees the execution will reach
the call site B with as few forced branches as possible.
There are some cases that need to be handled specially during the exploration,
which are discussed as below:
Event handlers. In static analysis, event handlers are added as the call targets of
their registration call sites. However, this is only for the purpose of path exploration
algorithm; the event handler itself is not actually invoked at its registration site.
Directly manipulating the call target at the registration call site to force a call to the
event handler will most likely fail because it does not provide the proper context for
the execution of the event handler. Therefore, the exploration of each event handler
has to be handled based on its type:
• Target-action. A target-action event handler is registered as a pair of action
selector and target object on a UIControl object. To trigger the event handler,
we use dispatch async to dispatch a call to the sendAction:to:forEvent:
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method on the main dispatching queue of the program. When the call is dispatched, the UIControl object sends a message with the action selector to the
target object.
• Delegates and data sources. We construct an NSInvocation to artificially
invoke a specific event handler implemented by a delegate or data source. The
target of the NSInvocation is set to the delegate or data source object, and
the selector is set to the name of the event handler. The first argument is the
UIView object which the delegate or the data source is assigned to. We pass
zero to all other arguments by allocating a zeroed bu↵er on the stack that is as
long as the size of the remaining arguments. The NSInvocation we construct
is then dispatched on the main dispatching queue of the program.
Nib file loading with UINib. As we mentioned in Section 4.4.3, UINib class involves two steps to load a Nib file. We track the call to the nibWithNibName:bundle:
method to record the name of the Nib file cached in the UINib object in the first step.
When the program later calls instantiateWithOwner:options: on a UINib object
to load the cached Nib file, we refer to the recorded information to get the name
of the corresponding Nib file. At this time, we can resolve the calls involved in the
Nib-loading process as both the Nib file name and the owner object are known.
Once the exploration has finished, the revealed call targets at the unresolved call
site will be merged into the current call graph (line 9). Theoretically, the complexity
of exploration of all possible paths is exponential to the number of related call sites.
In practice, we support a number of exploration strategies (e.g. linear and quadratic)
with di↵erent trade-o↵s between completeness and complexity. In our current implementation, we choose to use the linear complexity exploration strategy.

4.5 Evaluation
We evaluated iRiS on 2019 free applications obtained from one of the largest official
App Stores. These applications are the ones listed as popular apps of the following
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Table 4.1.: Uses of private APIs detected by iRiS in iOS applications.
Category

Framework
SpringBoardServices

Access
Application
Information
MobileCoreServices
AppleAccount
AdSupport

Access User’s
Identification
Information
IOKit

Access User’s
Data/Settings

WebKit
UIKit

Anti-debugging

libsystem

API Name
SBSSpringBoardServerPort
SBSCopyApplicationDisplayIdentifiers
SBFrontmostApplicationDisplayIdentifier
SBSCopyLocalizedApplicationNameForDisplayIdentifier
[LSApplicationWorkspace defaultWorkspace]
[LSApplicationWorkspace allApplications]
[LSApplicationWorkspace allInstalledApplications]
[LSApplicationWorkspace applicationIsInstalled:]
[AADeviceInfo appleIDClientIdentifier]
[ASIdentifierManager sharedManager]
[ASIdentifierManager advertisingIdentifier]
[ASIdentifierManager advertisingTrackingEnabled]
IOMasterPort
IOServiceMatching
IOServiceGetMatchingService
IORegistryEntryCreateCFProperty
IORegistryEntryCreateCFProperties
IORegistryGetRootEntry
IORegistryEntryGetChildIterator
IOIteratorNext
IORegistryEntryGetNameInPlane
IOObjectRelease
[WebPreferences setJavaScriptEnabled:]
[WebView mainFrameURL]
[WebFrame approximateNodeAtViewportLocation:]
[UIStatusBarServer getStatusBarData]
[UIView createSnapshotWithRect:]
ptrace

Functionality
Initialize port with SpringBoard
Obtain bundle ids of all running apps
Obtain bundle id of the front most app
Get app name from its bundle id
Obtain the default workspace object
Get all installed apps
Get all installed apps
Check if a specific app is installed
Obtain the Apple ID of the device user
Obtain reference to the AdID manager
Obtain the device’s AdID
Check if advertising tracking is enabled
Initialize communication with IOKit
Find & open specified IOService object
Locate specific property (e.g. S/N)
Iterate through all properties to
find information (e.g. Battery id,
IMEI)
Release the IOService object
Enable/Disable Javascript
Get the URL of the current page
Get DOM Node at specified location
Get precise battery level
Capture the view as an image
Prevent GDB attaching

#apps
3
3
3
33
2
1
1
1
1
25
25
23
21
21
21
19
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
3
1
1
1
1

categories in iTunes preview [97]: education, entertainment, finance, fitness, lifestyle,
medical, productivity, social and utility. We crawled the iTunes preview website to
retrieve the item ids of these applications. We download the applications through
iTunes and decrypt them on iOS device using the dumpdecrypted [98] tool.
Among the 2019 applications, iRiS identified 149 applications that contain invocations to a total of 153 di↵erent private APIs. Among these private APIs, many of
them are for implementing non-standard user interface features. For example, several applications use setOrientation: method in the UIDevice class to force the
orientation of the device display. Although uses of such APIs also violate the iOS
developer license agreement, we will not discuss them in detail here since they are not
directly related to security. The remaining invoked private APIs that are related to
security and user privacy are categorized and shown in Table 4.1, which are discussed
as below.
Accessing Application Information. SpringBoardServices is the framework
that handles application launching, management and termination on iOS. It contains
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various APIs to query the status of the applications on the device. We found three
applications using these APIs to obtain the bundle identifiers of the currently running
and the front most application(s). After the bundle identifiers are retrieved, they are
translated to application names by calling another private API. We also observed
other 30 applications that call the bundle id translation API. The translation API
returns a NULL pointer for non-existing bundle id, which is used by those applications
to detect whether a specific application exists on the device.
We also found two applications using private APIs in LSApplicationWorkspace
class of the MobileCoreServices framework to obtain the information of all applications installed on the device. The use of the allApplications API to get the
bundle id list of all installed applications is also mentioned in a recent work [99]. We
speculate that the two applications use these APIs instead of the private APIs in the
SpringBoardServices framework because the latter ones are blocked by Apple since
iOS 8.
Accessing User’s Identification Information. We found one application that
invokes the appleIDClientIdentifier API in the AADeviceInfo class to obtain the
Apple ID of the current user. Also, there are 25 applications using the APIs in the
ASIdentifierManager class to obtain the Advertising Identifier (AdID) of the device.
AdID is an identifier which could be used to uniquely identify an iOS device. It serves
as the replacement of the unique device identifier (UDID) for advertisement serving
organizations after the access to UDID is disabled since iOS 7. As mentioned in
Apple’s documentation [100], AdID should only be accessed by advertisement serving
libraries (e.g. Google AdMobs). However, we found that the crashlytics library,
which is a library for crash reporting, calls these private APIs to access AdID in these
25 applications.
We also found 21 applications using private APIs exported by the IOKit framework to access various hardware information. The IOKit framework is for communication with low-level hardware on the iOS device. It exports various hardware
components as a tree of IOService objects. We found that 19 of these applications
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use the IORegistryEntryCreateCFProperty API to read for the serial number of the
device from the IOPlatformSerialNumber property in the tree of IOService objects.
The rest two applications use a set of private APIs in IOKit to iterate through the
tree of IOService objects to find the desired information. We manually inspected
these two applications and found out that they try to obtain the ID of the battery
and the serial numbers of the front and back camera by looking for the properties of
specific names. Further investigation reveals that the serial number of the iOS device
itself is protected by entitlement since iOS 8; however, the identification information
of battery and cameras are still available.
Accessing User’s Data/Settings. We found a mobile browser application using
private APIs in the WebKit framework which allows it to access data of the current
web page and web browsing settings. The WebKit APIs are public on OS X (Apple’s
desktop OS); on iOS, Apple has wrapped the web browsing interface in the UIWebView
class as a black box and make WebKit APIs private to prevent third-party application
from accessing user’s data or change web browsing settings.
We also identified two applications using private APIs in the UIKit framework to
access sensitive user data. One of them tries to obtain the current battery level from
the status bar; according to our investigation, this private API allows the application
to get the precise battery level compared with using the batteryLevel public API
in the UIDevice framework, which only rounds the battery level to the nearest 5%.
The other application calls another private API in the UIView class which allows the
application to capture the displayed content in a view as an image.
Anti-debugging. We found that the Skype application calls the ptrace function
with the PT DENY ATTACH argument to prevent itself from being attached by GDB.
Since ptrace is a private API that is not declared in the header files in iOS SDK,
the application calls dlsym to dynamically retrieve the entry address and then make
a call to the function.
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Table 4.2.: Private API Invocations in AP PS .

Address
0xdeec2
0xdef46
0xdf056
0xfcf86
0xfcf8e
0xfd070
0xfd0c2
0xfc632
0xebfaa
0xebfd0

Private API
SBSSpringBoardServerPort
SBSCopyApplicationDisplayIdentifiers
SBFrontmostApplicationDisplayIdentifier
IOServiceMatching
IOServiceGetMatchingService
IORegistryEntryCreateCFProperty
IOObjectRelease
SBSCopyLocalizedApplicationNameForDisplayIdentifier
[LSApplicationWorkspace defaultWorkspace]
[LSApplicationWorkspace allApplications]

4.5.1 Case Study: A Suspicious Advertisement Service Provider
In this case study, we discuss our experience of identifying a suspicious advertisement service provider from the iOS applications in the App Store. Our finding
started from the analysis of a utility application, anonymized as AP PS . The size of
the application binary is 3.21 MB and its disassembly produced by IDA Pro contains
709894 instructions.
We used iRiS to perform thorough analysis on this application. In the static
analysis stage, iRiS identified a total number of 210534 call sites (excluding the ones
in API call stubs), in which 52814 were Objective-C message dispatching calls. iRiS
successfully resolved most of the call targets in the static analysis; there were 21
unresolved call sites left to be examined in the iterative dynamic analysis stage.
Despite the large number of statically resolved call targets, none of them actually
pointed to any private API.
iRiS first performed a natural run of the application in the dynamic analysis
stage. In the natural run, 13 of the 21 unresolved call sites were covered; 8 of them
were targeting private APIs. The private APIs being called are the ones in the
SpringBoardServices framework for accessing application information and the ones
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in the IOKit framework for accessing the serial number of the device shown in Table 4.1. There were also three of them calling the APIs in the AdSupport framework
to get the AdID of the device. However, since our later analysis shows those three
calls are in an advertisement serving library, we do not considered them as private
API calls.
The remaining 8 call sites not covered in the natural run were resolved iteratively
with forced execution. Two of them target private APIs in the MobileCoreService
framework for obtaining the bundle ids of all installed apps; the rest of the call targets
are functions in the application binary. We closely examined the two private API call
sites and found that they shared a very close ancestor on the call graph with the
call sites that call private APIs in the SpringBoardServices frameworks. We then
manually inspected the functions around the region and found out that their least
common ancestor on the control-flow graph is a branch that checks if the iOS version
is less than 8.0. If so, the application calls the APIs in the SpringBoardService
framework to get the information about applications on the device; otherwise, it uses
the APIs in the MobileCoreService framework as the former ones are blocked. Since
our device runs iOS 7.0, such behavior and the additional private APIs would not be
revealed, had we not used iRiS to analyze the application.
The private APIs invoked in AP PS and their call sites addresses are listed in
Table 4.2. Since the application collected a lot of user privacy information, we
would like to know where the information was sent to. To answer this question,
we inspected the dynamic execution trace and found that there were a series of
API calls right after the private API calls to post a HTTP request to the domain
http://ios.wall.youmi.net. We then manually reverse engineered the functions
along the path in the application and found out the user privacy information was
encoded in the URL and sent as part of the HTTP request.
We accessed the domain at http://www.youmi.net which is a web site of a Chinese advertisement service provider. They provide advertisement serving library for
iOS application developers to use their service, which we suspect might actually
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collect the user privacy information. The library is provided as binary and headers without source code. To verify our concern, we downloaded the library, built a
dummy application with it and analyzed the application using iRiS. As we expected,
the application exhibited similar behavior to AP PS and sent user information to this
advertisement service provider. It is worth noting that in the advertisement serving
library, the Objective-C class names and method names are all obfuscated to random
meaningless strings, probably to thwart the e↵ort of manual analysis.
The suspicious advertisement service provider claims on their web site that many
popular iOS applications have incorporated their advertisement serving library. In
fact, in the process of analyzing more iOS applications in our pool, we did find other
20 applications that exhibited similar behavior, which indicates they also use the same
library. Compared with individual iOS applications, the existence of such third-party
libraries poses greater threats to user privacy as they can a↵ect much more users by
residing in a large number of applications.

4.6 Limitation
iRiS might report private API calls that do not actually happen in real executions
since the application might be forced to infeasible paths during the exploration. In
such case, we argue that the application should still be considered as suspicious, as
it would be very unlikely that a legitimate application happens to have an infeasible
path that generates a private API call.
iRiS is not able to capture private API calls in control flow generated by external
input. Although dynamic code generation is prohibited in iOS, it is still possible to use
return oriented programming (ROP) to introduce irregular control flow with external
input, as shown in a recent work [40]. Malicious application developers might also
choose to use external input, such as network data to create the message selector for
Objective-C method calls. In such cases, the control flow could not be determined at
the time of application vetting, thus runtime approaches such as control-flow integrity
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is required to defend against the attack. Nevertheless, we consider our approach to
be orthogonal to runtime defense and the two complement each other.

4.7 Related Work
The work related to iRiS can be classified into three categories: (1) dynamic binary
instrumentation, (2) mobile application analysis and (3) mobile runtime hardening.
Dynamic binary instrumentation. Dynamic binary instrumentation frameworks
such as PIN [17], Valgrind [18], DynamoRIO [19] and QEMU [41] are widely used for
building dynamic analysis systems. All of them work on Android, but none supports
iOS. Even QEMU, the full system emulator, could not run iOS since it does not
emulate the required proprietary hardware of Apple. In iRiS, we ported Valgrind to
iOS to build our dynamic analysis. We envision the availability of dynamic binary
instrumentation on iOS would stimulate more future work on iOS security.
Mobile application analysis. There has been a lot of work in Android application
analysis. Enck et al. [30] proposed TaintDroid to dynamically track privacy leaks in
android applications. Lu et al. [31] presented CHEX which performs static data-flow
analysis to detect component hijacking attacks. Zhang et al. [32] presented VetDroid
to identify permission use behaviors in android applications using dynamic analysis.
Poeplau et al. [33] applied static analysis to detect attempts of loading malicious
code in Android applications. Johnson et al. [34] and Wang et al. [35] proposed to
switch branch outcomes to expose hidden behavior in Android apps. However, due
to the di↵erent nature of the two mobile operating systems, it is infeasible to apply
these techniques on iOS. For example, most of these analysis systems are targeting
the byte code running in Dalvik VM; in iOS, applications are compiled into native
ARM instructions which are directly executed by the CPU. The access control in iOS
is also completely di↵erent from the Android permission system.
Compared with Android, few work has been done in the domain of iOS application
analysis, which is closely related to iRiS. Egele et al. [38] were the first to present PiOS,
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a system to analyze privacy leaks in iOS application using static analysis. PiOS uses
backward slicing and constant propagation to resolve Objective-C method calls and
performs data-flow analysis to identify potential privacy leaks. In iRiS, we use similar
approaches in the static analysis stage. Compared with PiOS which only handles the
objc msgSend message dispatching function, iRiS covers traditional C function calls,
all types of Objective-C message dispatching functions and other implicit invoked
functions, which result in a more complete call graph. Also, as shown in result of
both PiOS and our work, static analysis itself usually is not enough to resolve all call
targets in the application binary.
Szydlowski et al. [88] discussed the challenges of performing dynamic analysis on
iOS applications. They proposed an approach to identify GUI views in iOS applications using image recognition. The execution of the application is driven by simulating
the interaction with identified GUI views using a VNC client. Joorabchi et al. [90]
proposed iCrawler to explore the UI states of iOS application by hooking into the
application to inspect and exercise the UI elements. Kurtz et al. [89] proposed DiOS
which utilizes UI Automation to retrieve the GUI hierarchy and interact with GUI elements. All of these three systems adopt the design of driving the execution of an iOS
application by interacting with the GUI elements, which su↵ers from two limitations.
First, it is generally infeasible to infer the interaction required to trigger a specific
event handler. For example, developers might implement touch event handlers which
only recognize and react to specific gestures. Second, even if proper interaction is
made on the UI element, the program might refuse to transit to a new UI state when
certain conditions are not met. For example, social applications usually require the
user to login with his/her account at start. In such cases, the aforementioned systems
would get stuck at the login screen and result in a very low code coverage. Di↵erent to the existing work, iRiS drives the execution of the application by capturing
the registration of event handlers and trigger their execution programmatically, and
applies forced execution so the application can get over various condition checks to
reach the desired instructions.
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Mobile runtime hardening. In addition to o✏ine mobile application analysis,
there also has been work focusing on hardening the execution environment of mobile
applications at runtime. Davi et al. [101] proposed MoCFI to enforce control-flow
integrity in mobile applications. MoCFI statically rewrites application binaries to
add control-flow integrity. Following to this work, Werthmann et al. [102] proposed
PSiOS which also employs static binary rewriting to add checks that enforce userdefined security and privacy policies. However, both solutions requires jailbreak of
the iOS device. Recently, Bucicoiu et al. [103] proposed XiOS to prevent use of
private APIs in iOS applications. XiOS statically rewrites application binaries to
instrument the API call stubs and insert a reference monitor that checks for private
API invocations. XiOS relies on the assumption that all calls to external APIs have to
go through the call stubs. However, advanced malicious application developers could
scan the address space with signatures of the target private API functions and obtain
the entry addresses to call the private APIs directly, which breaks such assumption.
iRiS detects uses of private APIs in the application vetting stage to complement these
runtime defenses.

4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we present iRiS, an iOS application vetting system that combines
static and dynamic analysis to detect uses of private APIs. Since iOS applications are
usually large in size, iRiS applies static analysis to resolve the targets of most API
invocations. To handle the remaining API invocations that could not be resolved
statically, we propose a novel iterative dynamic analysis approach based on forced
execution. We port the Valgrind dynamic binary instrumentation framework to iOS
to build the dynamic analysis in iRiS. To drive the execution of the event-driven iOS
applications, we propose an automated approach to trigger the execution of the event
handlers. Our evaluation with over 2000 iOS applications from the official App Store
shows that our technique e↵ectively reveals many uses of private APIs that are not
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detected by the official vetting process. We found a nontrivial number of applications
accessing and sending out sensitive user data such as installed applications and device
serial number. According to our findings, we believe that an advanced application
vetting system such as iRiS is crucial for ensuring the safety of iOS device users.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Malicious software, vulnerabilities and other software security problems have become
an increasing concern in recent years with the fast growth of the software industry.
To guarantee the security of software users, the capabilities of analyzing and manipulating software is crucial. Binary instrumentation and transformation are essential
techniques for software analysis and manipulation as binary executable is one of the
most common form of software distribution. However, existing static and dynamic
approaches all have serious limitations. Flexible static binary transformation is infeasible due to the lack of the capability to extract and embed binary components;
malware could easily bypass analysis as dynamic binary instrumentation frameworks
are not transparent to them; dynamic binary instrumentation is not even available
on iOS, one of the two dominant mobile platforms. In this dissertation, we have
presented three systems to improve binary instrumentation and transformation in
software security scenarios.
In chapter 2 we described our static binary transformation framework Bistro
which supports binary component extraction and embedding. Unlike existing detourbased or duplication-based static binary transformation approaches, Bistro supports
the insertion and removal of any instruction or data at arbitrary locations in the
binary. Bistro patches indirect control transfer instructions and data references with
the help of inserted address translators, thus preserves the correct semantic of both
the embedded component and the target program. We evaluated the performance of
Bistro using the binaries in SPEC CPU 2000 benchmark and real-world software,
which all shows low runtime and space overhead. We demonstrated the e↵ectiveness of
Bistro in three software security applications: (1) we carved the semantic patches
for six vulnerabilities from di↵erent applications, and embedded those patches in
other nine vulnerable applications to fix the same vulnerabilities; (2) we stitched
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components extracted from a non-executable corpse of the Conficker worm to create
a runnable sample for malware analysis and (3) we embedded functional components
in kernel drivers to create trojan-ed kernel drivers which can be leveraged in defensive
tasks.
In chapter 3 we discussed our dynamic binary instrumentation framework Spider which supports efficient and transparent trapping of the execution of binary at
arbitrary instructions. Spider places software breakpoints and utilizes the feature
in recent commodity CPUs to hide the breakpoints by splitting the instruction and
data views. We also proposed an efficient mechanism of monitoring page table to
accommodate updates in mappings between virtual and physical pages, which allows
the user of Spider to set breakpoints at arbitrary virtual address in target binary.
In our evaluation of Spider, we demonstrated that Spider successfully remained
transparent to seven advanced software protectors equipped with state-of-the-art antiinstrumentation techniques. The performance of the invisible breakpoint placed by
Spider is as good as traditional hardware breakpoint. We also applied Spider in two
software security scenarios: (1) we improved existing attack provenance system by using Spider to instrument applications protected by advanced software protectors and
(2) we used Spider to reveal a possible threat to two instant messenger applications
protected by software protectors which allows attackers to steal user information.
In chapter 4 we described iRiS, our system for detecting uses of private APIs
in iOS applications using a combination of static analysis and dynamic binary instrumentation. We ported the popular dynamic binary instrumentation framework
Valgrind to the iOS mobile platform and built iRiS on top of it. iRiS applies fast
static analysis to resolve most API invocations. The remaining API calls are resolved
by our iterative analysis approach based on forced execution using our dynamic binary instrumentation framework. Our evaluation of iRiS prototype with over 2000
iOS applications shows that iRiS successfully identified many private API uses that
were not found by Apple’s official application vetting process.
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5.1 Future Work
While Bistro, Spider and iRiS are e↵ective solutions of binary instrumentation
and transformation for software security applications, they all have limitations which
open up the opportunities for future extensions and improvements.
Bistro currently only supports x86 instructions and Win32 PE format executables. Extending Bistro to other binary executable formats should be feasible as
it does not rely on any specific feature of Win32 PE binaries. However, extending
Bistro to other instruction sets (e.g. ARM) requires us to throughly enumerate
and handle the control transfer instructions and memory addressing modes. Another
possible extension to Bistro is to enable binary transformation at load time or even
runtime. The address translator snippets inserted by Bistro are able to handle the
address changes caused by transformation; however, the address mapping needs to
be updated each time a transformation happens, which calls for a new data structure that can be more efficiently modified rather than perfect hashing to store the
mapping.
As we have discussed in chapter 3, Spider executes all instrumentation functions
in the context of the hypervisor to prevent potential in-guest side e↵ects. Compared
with Spider, in most other dynamic binary instrumentation engines, the instrumentation routine is usually executed in the context of the instrumented program
itself. Although such di↵erence does not a↵ect the functionality for passive instrumentation, it does make writing an instrumentation tool unnecessarily verbose and
complicated. An extension to Spider to handle this problem would be a dynamic
execution context translator which automatically translates the guest execution context to the context of the hypervisor for the instrumentation routines. In this way,
instrumentation tool authors could write their tools as if they run in the guest, and
even existing instrumentation tools for other frameworks could be ported to Spider
with slight modification.

105
Although we handled the timing side-e↵ect by manipulating the Time Stamp
Counter in Spider, it might still be detected with timing attacks using external time
sources (e.g. NTP servers, wall clocks). Also, performance counters such as number
of retired instructions might reveal the existence of Spider due to the execution
of additional instructions. An attacker might also find the footprint of Spider by
probing the Translation Look-aside Bu↵er (TLB) or various caches. We plan to study
the approaches of countering such side-channel attacks to Spider in the future.
Spider is currently only implemented in x86 architecture. However, our key idea
of splitting the code and data view is not specific to the x86 architecture. We plan
to port Spider to ARM when hardware virtualization support on ARM is mature.
The list of private APIs identified by iRiS might be incomplete since iRiS cannot
a↵ord to explore all paths leading to the API call sites in dynamic analysis. In our
current implementation, we adopt the linear exploration strategy, which does not
reveal private API calls that require a combination of multiple functions to trigger.
A possible future work to alleviate such problem should experiment and evaluate
more complex exploration strategies, such as quadratic search to achieve better path
coverage. One possible optimization to reduce the search space is to apply taint
analysis and only explore the branches whose predicates are tainted by the input.
Another direction for reducing the total time of application vetting is to parallelize
the call targets resolving algorithm so multiple devices could be used to speed up the
analysis of one application.
The current implementation of iRiS does not cover all types of implicit function
invocations in iOS frameworks. For example, the NSTimer class allows developers to
register a callback function which is called when the timer fires. Handling all such
implicit function invocations is an extension to e↵ectively improve the completeness
of iRiS, which requires careful examination of all classes and APIs provided in iOS
frameworks.
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